Deterrence and reciprocity effects on tax compliance: experimental evidence from Venezuela

Autores
Ortega, Daniel; Sanguinetti, Pablo
Año de publicación
2013
Idioma
español castellano
Tipo de recurso
documento de conferencia
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Why do people pay taxes? One obvious answer is that there are enforcement mechanism (fines and penalties) established by the State. This deterrence approach to tax compliance has been formally analyzed in the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). In this model tax payers decide whether and how much to evade taxes in the same way they would approach any risky decision or gamble, that is, by maximizing expected utility (Slemrod (2007)). Under this framework tax evasion is negatively associated with the probability of detection and the severity of punishment. (Párrafo extraído del texto a modo de resumen)
Departamento de Economía
Materia
Ciencias Económicas
economía
Venezuela
impuesto
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Repositorio
SEDICI (UNLP)
Institución
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
OAI Identificador
oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/35172
Acceder
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network_name_str SEDICI (UNLP)
spelling Deterrence and reciprocity effects on tax compliance: experimental evidence from VenezuelaOrtega, DanielSanguinetti, PabloCiencias EconómicaseconomíaVenezuelaimpuestoWhy do people pay taxes? One obvious answer is that there are enforcement mechanism (fines and penalties) established by the State. This deterrence approach to tax compliance has been formally analyzed in the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). In this model tax payers decide whether and how much to evade taxes in the same way they would approach any risky decision or gamble, that is, by maximizing expected utility (Slemrod (2007)). Under this framework tax evasion is negatively associated with the probability of detection and the severity of punishment. <i>(Párrafo extraído del texto a modo de resumen)</i>Departamento de Economía2013-07info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionObjeto de conferenciahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794info:ar-repo/semantics/documentoDeConferenciaapplication/pdfhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/35172spainfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/financlocal/12-Ortega-Sanguinetti.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-09-29T10:59:12Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/35172Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-09-29 10:59:12.342SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Deterrence and reciprocity effects on tax compliance: experimental evidence from Venezuela
title Deterrence and reciprocity effects on tax compliance: experimental evidence from Venezuela
spellingShingle Deterrence and reciprocity effects on tax compliance: experimental evidence from Venezuela
Ortega, Daniel
Ciencias Económicas
economía
Venezuela
impuesto
title_short Deterrence and reciprocity effects on tax compliance: experimental evidence from Venezuela
title_full Deterrence and reciprocity effects on tax compliance: experimental evidence from Venezuela
title_fullStr Deterrence and reciprocity effects on tax compliance: experimental evidence from Venezuela
title_full_unstemmed Deterrence and reciprocity effects on tax compliance: experimental evidence from Venezuela
title_sort Deterrence and reciprocity effects on tax compliance: experimental evidence from Venezuela
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Ortega, Daniel
Sanguinetti, Pablo
author Ortega, Daniel
author_facet Ortega, Daniel
Sanguinetti, Pablo
author_role author
author2 Sanguinetti, Pablo
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Ciencias Económicas
economía
Venezuela
impuesto
topic Ciencias Económicas
economía
Venezuela
impuesto
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Why do people pay taxes? One obvious answer is that there are enforcement mechanism (fines and penalties) established by the State. This deterrence approach to tax compliance has been formally analyzed in the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). In this model tax payers decide whether and how much to evade taxes in the same way they would approach any risky decision or gamble, that is, by maximizing expected utility (Slemrod (2007)). Under this framework tax evasion is negatively associated with the probability of detection and the severity of punishment. <i>(Párrafo extraído del texto a modo de resumen)</i>
Departamento de Economía
description Why do people pay taxes? One obvious answer is that there are enforcement mechanism (fines and penalties) established by the State. This deterrence approach to tax compliance has been formally analyzed in the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). In this model tax payers decide whether and how much to evade taxes in the same way they would approach any risky decision or gamble, that is, by maximizing expected utility (Slemrod (2007)). Under this framework tax evasion is negatively associated with the probability of detection and the severity of punishment. <i>(Párrafo extraído del texto a modo de resumen)</i>
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-07
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info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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