Definite descriptions, misdescriptions and semantic content: different ways to solve a tricky puzzle

Autores
Díaz Legaspe, Justina
Año de publicación
2009
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Michael Devitt (2004, 2007) claims that the predicative material that constitutes complex referential expressions makes a semantic contribution to the proposition expressed. He thus deviates from direct referentialism, according to which every referential expression –either simple or complex– contributes just with an object to the proposition expressed, leaving the predicative material out of the semantic content. However, when dealing with misdescriptions, Devitt has suggested a pragmatic way out: the audience can understand what the speaker is referring to even if the object does not fall under the corresponding description. From my perspective, this proposal questions the semantic validity of the predicative material, together with Devitt’s original claim. In this paper, I propose a way to solve the problem posed by misdescriptions that appeals to the idea of epistemically relativized properties, according to which the properties ascribed to the object –by means of the predicative material– correspond to the way the speaker thinks of it and not to the way the object really is.
Michael Devitt (2004, 2007) sostiene que el material predicativo que constituye las expresiones referenciales complejas hace un aporte semántico a la proposición expresada, alejándose así del referencialismo directo, para el cual toda expresión referencial –sea ésta simple o compleja– contribuye sólo con un objeto singular a la proposición expresada. Sin embargo, al enfrentarse al problema de las descripciones fallidas, Devitt ofrece una salida pragmática: el oyente comprende a qué se refiere el hablante aun cuando el objeto referido no caiga bajo la descripción utilizada. Esto pone en cuestión la validez semántica del material predicativo, desestimando la postura original de Devitt. En el trabajo propongo una solución a este problema, apelando a la idea de propiedades epistémicamente relativizadas, de acuerdo con la cual lo que se predica del objeto por medio del material predicativo corresponde a las creencias del hablante, y no a lo que el objeto realmente es.
Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación
Materia
Filosofía
Definite description
Reference
Misdescription
Descripción definida
Referencia
Descripción fallida
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Repositorio
SEDICI (UNLP)
Institución
Universidad Nacional de La Plata
OAI Identificador
oai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/110783

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spelling Definite descriptions, misdescriptions and semantic content: different ways to solve a tricky puzzleDíaz Legaspe, JustinaFilosofíaDefinite descriptionReferenceMisdescriptionDescripción definidaReferenciaDescripción fallidaMichael Devitt (2004, 2007) claims that the predicative material that constitutes complex referential expressions makes a semantic contribution to the proposition expressed. He thus deviates from direct referentialism, according to which every referential expression –either simple or complex– contributes just with an object to the proposition expressed, leaving the predicative material out of the semantic content. However, when dealing with misdescriptions, Devitt has suggested a pragmatic way out: the audience can understand what the speaker is referring to even if the object does not fall under the corresponding description. From my perspective, this proposal questions the semantic validity of the predicative material, together with Devitt’s original claim. In this paper, I propose a way to solve the problem posed by misdescriptions that appeals to the idea of epistemically relativized properties, according to which the properties ascribed to the object –by means of the predicative material– correspond to the way the speaker thinks of it and not to the way the object really is.Michael Devitt (2004, 2007) sostiene que el material predicativo que constituye las expresiones referenciales complejas hace un aporte semántico a la proposición expresada, alejándose así del referencialismo directo, para el cual toda expresión referencial –sea ésta simple o compleja– contribuye sólo con un objeto singular a la proposición expresada. Sin embargo, al enfrentarse al problema de las descripciones fallidas, Devitt ofrece una salida pragmática: el oyente comprende a qué se refiere el hablante aun cuando el objeto referido no caiga bajo la descripción utilizada. Esto pone en cuestión la validez semántica del material predicativo, desestimando la postura original de Devitt. En el trabajo propongo una solución a este problema, apelando a la idea de propiedades epistémicamente relativizadas, de acuerdo con la cual lo que se predica del objeto por medio del material predicativo corresponde a las creencias del hablante, y no a lo que el objeto realmente es.Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación2009info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArticulohttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdf159-166http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/110783enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://analisisfilosofico.org/index.php/af/article/view/140info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1851-9636info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)reponame:SEDICI (UNLP)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Platainstacron:UNLP2025-09-03T10:57:24Zoai:sedici.unlp.edu.ar:10915/110783Institucionalhttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/oai/snrdalira@sedici.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13292025-09-03 10:57:24.376SEDICI (UNLP) - Universidad Nacional de La Platafalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Definite descriptions, misdescriptions and semantic content: different ways to solve a tricky puzzle
title Definite descriptions, misdescriptions and semantic content: different ways to solve a tricky puzzle
spellingShingle Definite descriptions, misdescriptions and semantic content: different ways to solve a tricky puzzle
Díaz Legaspe, Justina
Filosofía
Definite description
Reference
Misdescription
Descripción definida
Referencia
Descripción fallida
title_short Definite descriptions, misdescriptions and semantic content: different ways to solve a tricky puzzle
title_full Definite descriptions, misdescriptions and semantic content: different ways to solve a tricky puzzle
title_fullStr Definite descriptions, misdescriptions and semantic content: different ways to solve a tricky puzzle
title_full_unstemmed Definite descriptions, misdescriptions and semantic content: different ways to solve a tricky puzzle
title_sort Definite descriptions, misdescriptions and semantic content: different ways to solve a tricky puzzle
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Díaz Legaspe, Justina
author Díaz Legaspe, Justina
author_facet Díaz Legaspe, Justina
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Filosofía
Definite description
Reference
Misdescription
Descripción definida
Referencia
Descripción fallida
topic Filosofía
Definite description
Reference
Misdescription
Descripción definida
Referencia
Descripción fallida
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Michael Devitt (2004, 2007) claims that the predicative material that constitutes complex referential expressions makes a semantic contribution to the proposition expressed. He thus deviates from direct referentialism, according to which every referential expression –either simple or complex– contributes just with an object to the proposition expressed, leaving the predicative material out of the semantic content. However, when dealing with misdescriptions, Devitt has suggested a pragmatic way out: the audience can understand what the speaker is referring to even if the object does not fall under the corresponding description. From my perspective, this proposal questions the semantic validity of the predicative material, together with Devitt’s original claim. In this paper, I propose a way to solve the problem posed by misdescriptions that appeals to the idea of epistemically relativized properties, according to which the properties ascribed to the object –by means of the predicative material– correspond to the way the speaker thinks of it and not to the way the object really is.
Michael Devitt (2004, 2007) sostiene que el material predicativo que constituye las expresiones referenciales complejas hace un aporte semántico a la proposición expresada, alejándose así del referencialismo directo, para el cual toda expresión referencial –sea ésta simple o compleja– contribuye sólo con un objeto singular a la proposición expresada. Sin embargo, al enfrentarse al problema de las descripciones fallidas, Devitt ofrece una salida pragmática: el oyente comprende a qué se refiere el hablante aun cuando el objeto referido no caiga bajo la descripción utilizada. Esto pone en cuestión la validez semántica del material predicativo, desestimando la postura original de Devitt. En el trabajo propongo una solución a este problema, apelando a la idea de propiedades epistémicamente relativizadas, de acuerdo con la cual lo que se predica del objeto por medio del material predicativo corresponde a las creencias del hablante, y no a lo que el objeto realmente es.
Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación
description Michael Devitt (2004, 2007) claims that the predicative material that constitutes complex referential expressions makes a semantic contribution to the proposition expressed. He thus deviates from direct referentialism, according to which every referential expression –either simple or complex– contributes just with an object to the proposition expressed, leaving the predicative material out of the semantic content. However, when dealing with misdescriptions, Devitt has suggested a pragmatic way out: the audience can understand what the speaker is referring to even if the object does not fall under the corresponding description. From my perspective, this proposal questions the semantic validity of the predicative material, together with Devitt’s original claim. In this paper, I propose a way to solve the problem posed by misdescriptions that appeals to the idea of epistemically relativized properties, according to which the properties ascribed to the object –by means of the predicative material– correspond to the way the speaker thinks of it and not to the way the object really is.
publishDate 2009
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2009
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Articulo
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/110783
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/110783
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://analisisfilosofico.org/index.php/af/article/view/140
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1851-9636
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
159-166
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instname:Universidad Nacional de La Plata
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