Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states

Autores
De Magalhães, Leandro; Ferrero, Lucas
Año de publicación
2015
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Fil: Ferrero, Lucas. Universidad Nacional del Nordeste. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas; Argentina.
Fil: De Magalhaes, Leandro. Universidad de Bristol. Escuela de Economía; Reino Unido.
We estimate a nonlinear and discontinuous relationship between the tax level and the degree of alignment between the legislature and the governor, measured as the number of seats in the legislature that belong to the governor s party. In the states with the line-item veto, the tax level jumps at the point where the government switches from divided to unified. With a regression discontinuity design, we show that this jump can be interpreted as a causal effect. We propose a simple model to account for this nonlinear relationship. The sequential nature of the budget bargaining game, that is, the legislature proposes and the governor cuts with the line-item veto, implies that the tax level is determined by the overlap between the supporters of the governor and the supporters of the legislative majority. Changes in the size of the overlap determine the tax level.
Fuente
Southern Economic Journal, 2015, vol. 82, no. 2, p. 1-22.
Materia
Estados Unidos
Tasa impositiva
Impuestos
Economía exterior
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE)
Institución
Universidad Nacional del Nordeste
OAI Identificador
oai:repositorio.unne.edu.ar:123456789/51388

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network_name_str Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE)
spelling Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. statesDe Magalhães, LeandroFerrero, LucasEstados UnidosTasa impositivaImpuestosEconomía exteriorFil: Ferrero, Lucas. Universidad Nacional del Nordeste. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas; Argentina.Fil: De Magalhaes, Leandro. Universidad de Bristol. Escuela de Economía; Reino Unido.We estimate a nonlinear and discontinuous relationship between the tax level and the degree of alignment between the legislature and the governor, measured as the number of seats in the legislature that belong to the governor s party. In the states with the line-item veto, the tax level jumps at the point where the government switches from divided to unified. With a regression discontinuity design, we show that this jump can be interpreted as a causal effect. We propose a simple model to account for this nonlinear relationship. The sequential nature of the budget bargaining game, that is, the legislature proposes and the governor cuts with the line-item veto, implies that the tax level is determined by the overlap between the supporters of the governor and the supporters of the legislative majority. Changes in the size of the overlap determine the tax level.Southern Economic Association2015info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfp. 1-22application/pdfDe Magalhães, Leandro y Ferrero, Lucas, 2015. Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states. Southern Economic Journal. Lubbock: Southern Economic Association, vol. 82, no. 2, p. 1-22. E-ISSN 2325-8012.0038-4038http://repositorio.unne.edu.ar/handle/123456789/51388Southern Economic Journal, 2015, vol. 82, no. 2, p. 1-22.reponame:Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE)instname:Universidad Nacional del Nordesteenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Argentina2025-09-29T14:30:39Zoai:repositorio.unne.edu.ar:123456789/51388instacron:UNNEInstitucionalhttp://repositorio.unne.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://repositorio.unne.edu.ar/oaiososa@bib.unne.edu.ar;sergio.alegria@unne.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:48712025-09-29 14:30:39.71Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE) - Universidad Nacional del Nordestefalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states
title Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states
spellingShingle Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states
De Magalhães, Leandro
Estados Unidos
Tasa impositiva
Impuestos
Economía exterior
title_short Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states
title_full Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states
title_fullStr Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states
title_full_unstemmed Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states
title_sort Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv De Magalhães, Leandro
Ferrero, Lucas
author De Magalhães, Leandro
author_facet De Magalhães, Leandro
Ferrero, Lucas
author_role author
author2 Ferrero, Lucas
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Estados Unidos
Tasa impositiva
Impuestos
Economía exterior
topic Estados Unidos
Tasa impositiva
Impuestos
Economía exterior
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Fil: Ferrero, Lucas. Universidad Nacional del Nordeste. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas; Argentina.
Fil: De Magalhaes, Leandro. Universidad de Bristol. Escuela de Economía; Reino Unido.
We estimate a nonlinear and discontinuous relationship between the tax level and the degree of alignment between the legislature and the governor, measured as the number of seats in the legislature that belong to the governor s party. In the states with the line-item veto, the tax level jumps at the point where the government switches from divided to unified. With a regression discontinuity design, we show that this jump can be interpreted as a causal effect. We propose a simple model to account for this nonlinear relationship. The sequential nature of the budget bargaining game, that is, the legislature proposes and the governor cuts with the line-item veto, implies that the tax level is determined by the overlap between the supporters of the governor and the supporters of the legislative majority. Changes in the size of the overlap determine the tax level.
description Fil: Ferrero, Lucas. Universidad Nacional del Nordeste. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas; Argentina.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv De Magalhães, Leandro y Ferrero, Lucas, 2015. Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states. Southern Economic Journal. Lubbock: Southern Economic Association, vol. 82, no. 2, p. 1-22. E-ISSN 2325-8012.
0038-4038
http://repositorio.unne.edu.ar/handle/123456789/51388
identifier_str_mv De Magalhães, Leandro y Ferrero, Lucas, 2015. Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states. Southern Economic Journal. Lubbock: Southern Economic Association, vol. 82, no. 2, p. 1-22. E-ISSN 2325-8012.
0038-4038
url http://repositorio.unne.edu.ar/handle/123456789/51388
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Argentina
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Argentina
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
p. 1-22
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Southern Economic Association
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Southern Economic Association
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Southern Economic Journal, 2015, vol. 82, no. 2, p. 1-22.
reponame:Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE)
instname:Universidad Nacional del Nordeste
reponame_str Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE)
collection Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE)
instname_str Universidad Nacional del Nordeste
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE) - Universidad Nacional del Nordeste
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ososa@bib.unne.edu.ar;sergio.alegria@unne.edu.ar
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