Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states
- Autores
- De Magalhães, Leandro; Ferrero, Lucas
- Año de publicación
- 2015
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- Fil: Ferrero, Lucas. Universidad Nacional del Nordeste. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas; Argentina.
Fil: De Magalhaes, Leandro. Universidad de Bristol. Escuela de Economía; Reino Unido.
We estimate a nonlinear and discontinuous relationship between the tax level and the degree of alignment between the legislature and the governor, measured as the number of seats in the legislature that belong to the governor s party. In the states with the line-item veto, the tax level jumps at the point where the government switches from divided to unified. With a regression discontinuity design, we show that this jump can be interpreted as a causal effect. We propose a simple model to account for this nonlinear relationship. The sequential nature of the budget bargaining game, that is, the legislature proposes and the governor cuts with the line-item veto, implies that the tax level is determined by the overlap between the supporters of the governor and the supporters of the legislative majority. Changes in the size of the overlap determine the tax level. - Fuente
- Southern Economic Journal, 2015, vol. 82, no. 2, p. 1-22.
- Materia
-
Estados Unidos
Tasa impositiva
Impuestos
Economía exterior - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Universidad Nacional del Nordeste
- OAI Identificador
- oai:repositorio.unne.edu.ar:123456789/51388
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. statesDe Magalhães, LeandroFerrero, LucasEstados UnidosTasa impositivaImpuestosEconomía exteriorFil: Ferrero, Lucas. Universidad Nacional del Nordeste. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas; Argentina.Fil: De Magalhaes, Leandro. Universidad de Bristol. Escuela de Economía; Reino Unido.We estimate a nonlinear and discontinuous relationship between the tax level and the degree of alignment between the legislature and the governor, measured as the number of seats in the legislature that belong to the governor s party. In the states with the line-item veto, the tax level jumps at the point where the government switches from divided to unified. With a regression discontinuity design, we show that this jump can be interpreted as a causal effect. We propose a simple model to account for this nonlinear relationship. The sequential nature of the budget bargaining game, that is, the legislature proposes and the governor cuts with the line-item veto, implies that the tax level is determined by the overlap between the supporters of the governor and the supporters of the legislative majority. Changes in the size of the overlap determine the tax level.Southern Economic Association2015info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfp. 1-22application/pdfDe Magalhães, Leandro y Ferrero, Lucas, 2015. Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states. Southern Economic Journal. Lubbock: Southern Economic Association, vol. 82, no. 2, p. 1-22. E-ISSN 2325-8012.0038-4038http://repositorio.unne.edu.ar/handle/123456789/51388Southern Economic Journal, 2015, vol. 82, no. 2, p. 1-22.reponame:Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE)instname:Universidad Nacional del Nordesteenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Argentina2025-09-29T14:30:39Zoai:repositorio.unne.edu.ar:123456789/51388instacron:UNNEInstitucionalhttp://repositorio.unne.edu.ar/Universidad públicaNo correspondehttp://repositorio.unne.edu.ar/oaiososa@bib.unne.edu.ar;sergio.alegria@unne.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:48712025-09-29 14:30:39.71Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE) - Universidad Nacional del Nordestefalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states |
title |
Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states |
spellingShingle |
Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states De Magalhães, Leandro Estados Unidos Tasa impositiva Impuestos Economía exterior |
title_short |
Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states |
title_full |
Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states |
title_fullStr |
Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states |
title_full_unstemmed |
Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states |
title_sort |
Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
De Magalhães, Leandro Ferrero, Lucas |
author |
De Magalhães, Leandro |
author_facet |
De Magalhães, Leandro Ferrero, Lucas |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Ferrero, Lucas |
author2_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Estados Unidos Tasa impositiva Impuestos Economía exterior |
topic |
Estados Unidos Tasa impositiva Impuestos Economía exterior |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
Fil: Ferrero, Lucas. Universidad Nacional del Nordeste. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas; Argentina. Fil: De Magalhaes, Leandro. Universidad de Bristol. Escuela de Economía; Reino Unido. We estimate a nonlinear and discontinuous relationship between the tax level and the degree of alignment between the legislature and the governor, measured as the number of seats in the legislature that belong to the governor s party. In the states with the line-item veto, the tax level jumps at the point where the government switches from divided to unified. With a regression discontinuity design, we show that this jump can be interpreted as a causal effect. We propose a simple model to account for this nonlinear relationship. The sequential nature of the budget bargaining game, that is, the legislature proposes and the governor cuts with the line-item veto, implies that the tax level is determined by the overlap between the supporters of the governor and the supporters of the legislative majority. Changes in the size of the overlap determine the tax level. |
description |
Fil: Ferrero, Lucas. Universidad Nacional del Nordeste. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas; Argentina. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2015 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
De Magalhães, Leandro y Ferrero, Lucas, 2015. Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states. Southern Economic Journal. Lubbock: Southern Economic Association, vol. 82, no. 2, p. 1-22. E-ISSN 2325-8012. 0038-4038 http://repositorio.unne.edu.ar/handle/123456789/51388 |
identifier_str_mv |
De Magalhães, Leandro y Ferrero, Lucas, 2015. Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states. Southern Economic Journal. Lubbock: Southern Economic Association, vol. 82, no. 2, p. 1-22. E-ISSN 2325-8012. 0038-4038 |
url |
http://repositorio.unne.edu.ar/handle/123456789/51388 |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/ Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Argentina |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/ Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Argentina |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf p. 1-22 application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Southern Economic Association |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Southern Economic Association |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Southern Economic Journal, 2015, vol. 82, no. 2, p. 1-22. reponame:Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE) instname:Universidad Nacional del Nordeste |
reponame_str |
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE) |
collection |
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE) |
instname_str |
Universidad Nacional del Nordeste |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE) - Universidad Nacional del Nordeste |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
ososa@bib.unne.edu.ar;sergio.alegria@unne.edu.ar |
_version_ |
1844621694820417536 |
score |
12.559606 |