Oil rents and patronage : the fiscal effects of oil booms in the argentine provinces
- Autores
- González, Lucas Isaac
- Año de publicación
- 2018
- Idioma
- español castellano
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- Fil: González, Lucas Isaac. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones; Argentina
Abstract: When do oil dependent governments spend oil rents in expanding political machines through patronage and clientelism, as rentier theories claim, or in providing better public services? Using regression analysis for panel data and two case studies for the Argentine provinces (1983-2013), this study shows that infrastructure can rise and patronage decline during oil booms. When rents are high and the oil sector creates new jobs, incumbents tend to increase capital investment. They cannot compete with oil salaries and use infrastructure to cope with the sector?s pressures for basic services. When rents decline in contexts of job destruction in the oil sector, and the rest of the private sector cannot absorb the layoffs, incumbents tend to increase patronage to contain social turmoil and secure core voters. - Fuente
- The Journal of Comparative Politics Vol. 51, 2018
- Materia
-
PETROLEO
CIENCIA POLITICA
CLIENTELISMO
INDUSTRIA DEL PETROLEO
EMPLEO - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ucacris:123456789/9015
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Oil rents and patronage : the fiscal effects of oil booms in the argentine provincesGonzález, Lucas IsaacPETROLEOCIENCIA POLITICACLIENTELISMOINDUSTRIA DEL PETROLEOEMPLEOFil: González, Lucas Isaac. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones; ArgentinaAbstract: When do oil dependent governments spend oil rents in expanding political machines through patronage and clientelism, as rentier theories claim, or in providing better public services? Using regression analysis for panel data and two case studies for the Argentine provinces (1983-2013), this study shows that infrastructure can rise and patronage decline during oil booms. When rents are high and the oil sector creates new jobs, incumbents tend to increase capital investment. They cannot compete with oil salaries and use infrastructure to cope with the sector?s pressures for basic services. When rents decline in contexts of job destruction in the oil sector, and the rest of the private sector cannot absorb the layoffs, incumbents tend to increase patronage to contain social turmoil and secure core voters.City University of New York2018info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfhttps://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/90150010-415910.5129/0010415188244146González, L. I. Oil rents and patronage : the fiscal effects of oil booms in the argentine provinces. [en línea]. The Journal of Comparative Politics. 2018, 51. Disponible en: https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/9015The Journal of Comparative Politics Vol. 51, 2018reponame:Repositorio Institucional (UCA)instname:Pontificia Universidad Católica ArgentinaspaLos Efectos Fiscales, Socioeconómicos y Políticos de las Rentas Petroleras. Las Provincias Argentinas en Perspectiva ComparadaArgentinainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/2025-07-03T10:57:00Zoai:ucacris:123456789/9015instacron:UCAInstitucionalhttps://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/Universidad privadaNo correspondehttps://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/oaiclaudia_fernandez@uca.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:25852025-07-03 10:57:00.746Repositorio Institucional (UCA) - Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentinafalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Oil rents and patronage : the fiscal effects of oil booms in the argentine provinces |
title |
Oil rents and patronage : the fiscal effects of oil booms in the argentine provinces |
spellingShingle |
Oil rents and patronage : the fiscal effects of oil booms in the argentine provinces González, Lucas Isaac PETROLEO CIENCIA POLITICA CLIENTELISMO INDUSTRIA DEL PETROLEO EMPLEO |
title_short |
Oil rents and patronage : the fiscal effects of oil booms in the argentine provinces |
title_full |
Oil rents and patronage : the fiscal effects of oil booms in the argentine provinces |
title_fullStr |
Oil rents and patronage : the fiscal effects of oil booms in the argentine provinces |
title_full_unstemmed |
Oil rents and patronage : the fiscal effects of oil booms in the argentine provinces |
title_sort |
Oil rents and patronage : the fiscal effects of oil booms in the argentine provinces |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
González, Lucas Isaac |
author |
González, Lucas Isaac |
author_facet |
González, Lucas Isaac |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
PETROLEO CIENCIA POLITICA CLIENTELISMO INDUSTRIA DEL PETROLEO EMPLEO |
topic |
PETROLEO CIENCIA POLITICA CLIENTELISMO INDUSTRIA DEL PETROLEO EMPLEO |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
Fil: González, Lucas Isaac. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones; Argentina Abstract: When do oil dependent governments spend oil rents in expanding political machines through patronage and clientelism, as rentier theories claim, or in providing better public services? Using regression analysis for panel data and two case studies for the Argentine provinces (1983-2013), this study shows that infrastructure can rise and patronage decline during oil booms. When rents are high and the oil sector creates new jobs, incumbents tend to increase capital investment. They cannot compete with oil salaries and use infrastructure to cope with the sector?s pressures for basic services. When rents decline in contexts of job destruction in the oil sector, and the rest of the private sector cannot absorb the layoffs, incumbents tend to increase patronage to contain social turmoil and secure core voters. |
description |
Fil: González, Lucas Isaac. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones; Argentina |
publishDate |
2018 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2018 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/9015 0010-4159 10.5129/0010415188244146 González, L. I. Oil rents and patronage : the fiscal effects of oil booms in the argentine provinces. [en línea]. The Journal of Comparative Politics. 2018, 51. Disponible en: https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/9015 |
url |
https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/9015 |
identifier_str_mv |
0010-4159 10.5129/0010415188244146 González, L. I. Oil rents and patronage : the fiscal effects of oil booms in the argentine provinces. [en línea]. The Journal of Comparative Politics. 2018, 51. Disponible en: https://repositorio.uca.edu.ar/handle/123456789/9015 |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Los Efectos Fiscales, Socioeconómicos y Políticos de las Rentas Petroleras. Las Provincias Argentinas en Perspectiva Comparada |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Argentina |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
City University of New York |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
City University of New York |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
The Journal of Comparative Politics Vol. 51, 2018 reponame:Repositorio Institucional (UCA) instname:Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina |
reponame_str |
Repositorio Institucional (UCA) |
collection |
Repositorio Institucional (UCA) |
instname_str |
Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositorio Institucional (UCA) - Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
claudia_fernandez@uca.edu.ar |
_version_ |
1836638348478775296 |
score |
12.993085 |