Eficiencia en subastas de múltiples objetos

• Autores: Mendiburu Díaz, Carlos H.
• Año de publicación: 2011
• Idioma: español castellano
• Tipo de recurso: tesis de maestría
• Colaborador/a o director/a de tesis: Kawamura, Enrique
• Materia: Auctions -- Mathematical models.; Subastas -- Modelos matemáticos.
• Institución: Universidad de San Andrés

Fil: Mendiburu Díaz, Carlos H.. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
This research aims to systematize recent findings about efficiency in multi-object auctions. The main questions are: Is it possible to reach efficiency in multi-object auctions? How? What factors affect efficiency, in theory and in practice? Several issues arise in the study of efficiency in auctions. For example, results vary depending on players attitude toward risk, on whether we assume private or common values, on whether objects are identical (which requires specifying whether each player has unit-demand or multi-unit demand), or heterogeneous (assuming players have de ned valuations for each possible package). A general point is that if one can use observed bids to infer valuations, it is possible to reach efficiency. For instance, it has been shown that efficiency can be achieved in multi-object auctions when players have independent private values and in common values settings with one-dimensional signals. This in general is not true with common values and multidimensional signals. Finally, there is a growing literature about experiments with auctions, designed in order to compare auction formats in terms of efficiency.