"En simples physiciens". La perception animale et la connaissance sensible selon Leibniz en 1714
- Autores
- Vargas, Evelyn
- Año de publicación
- 2019
- Idioma
- francés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- In his solution to the problem of sensible knowledge, Leibniz seeks to avoid the extreme positions held by the Cartesians and Hobbes. The conceptual distinctions that Leibniz introduces allow him to overcome difficulties raised by his own earlier definitions of sensus. He is consequently able to reconcile the continuity he introduces between animal and human perceptions with the normative and, at the same time, propositional aspects of perceptual judgments. In this paper I will begin by describing his late conception of both human and animal perception, and I will compare this notion with his early notion of perception and the difficulties it gave rise to; finally, I will show the advantages that his new conception can offer for solving the epistemic problem of perception.
La solution leibnizienne au problème de la connaissance sensible cherche à éviter les positions extrêmes que les cartésiens et Hobbes ont proposées. Les distinctions conceptuelles que Leibniz introduit lui permettent de surmonter des difficultés suscitées par ses premières définitions du sensus, et, en conséquence, de concilier les continuités entre les perceptions animale et humaine avec les conditions normatives et, pourtant, propositionnelles du jugement perceptuel. Dans cette étude, je commencerai par la description de cette conception tardive de la perception tant humaine qu'animale, et comparerai cette notion avec la première notion de la perception et les difficultés qu'elle suscitefinalement, je présenterai les avantages que la nouvelle conception peut offrir pour le problème épistémique de la perception.
Fil: Vargas, Evelyn. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación. Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales (UNLP-CONICET); Argentina. - Fuente
- Lexicon philosophicum(8), 27-35. (2020)
ISSN 2283-783 - Materia
-
Filosofía
Leibniz
Principles of Nature and Grace
Human perception
Animal perception
Sensible knowledge - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación
- OAI Identificador
- oai:memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar:snrd:Jpr16638
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"En simples physiciens". La perception animale et la connaissance sensible selon Leibniz en 1714Vargas, EvelynFilosofíaLeibnizPrinciples of Nature and GraceHuman perceptionAnimal perceptionSensible knowledgeIn his solution to the problem of sensible knowledge, Leibniz seeks to avoid the extreme positions held by the Cartesians and Hobbes. The conceptual distinctions that Leibniz introduces allow him to overcome difficulties raised by his own earlier definitions of sensus. He is consequently able to reconcile the continuity he introduces between animal and human perceptions with the normative and, at the same time, propositional aspects of perceptual judgments. In this paper I will begin by describing his late conception of both human and animal perception, and I will compare this notion with his early notion of perception and the difficulties it gave rise to; finally, I will show the advantages that his new conception can offer for solving the epistemic problem of perception.La solution leibnizienne au problème de la connaissance sensible cherche à éviter les positions extrêmes que les cartésiens et Hobbes ont proposées. Les distinctions conceptuelles que Leibniz introduit lui permettent de surmonter des difficultés suscitées par ses premières définitions du sensus, et, en conséquence, de concilier les continuités entre les perceptions animale et humaine avec les conditions normatives et, pourtant, propositionnelles du jugement perceptuel. Dans cette étude, je commencerai par la description de cette conception tardive de la perception tant humaine qu'animale, et comparerai cette notion avec la première notion de la perception et les difficultés qu'elle suscitefinalement, je présenterai les avantages que la nouvelle conception peut offrir pour le problème épistémique de la perception.Fil: Vargas, Evelyn. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación. Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales (UNLP-CONICET); Argentina.2019info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfhttps://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/art_revistas/pr.16638/pr.16638.pdfLexicon philosophicum(8), 27-35. (2020)ISSN 2283-783reponame:Memoria Académica (UNLP-FAHCE)instname:Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educacióninstacron:UNLPfrainfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/11336/181374info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.19283/lph-20208.667info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/2025-09-29T11:53:51Zoai:memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar:snrd:Jpr16638Institucionalhttps://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/Universidad públicahttps://www.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/https://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/oaiserver.cgimemoria@fahce.unlp.edu.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:13412025-09-29 11:53:52.87Memoria Académica (UNLP-FAHCE) - Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educaciónfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
"En simples physiciens". La perception animale et la connaissance sensible selon Leibniz en 1714 |
title |
"En simples physiciens". La perception animale et la connaissance sensible selon Leibniz en 1714 |
spellingShingle |
"En simples physiciens". La perception animale et la connaissance sensible selon Leibniz en 1714 Vargas, Evelyn Filosofía Leibniz Principles of Nature and Grace Human perception Animal perception Sensible knowledge |
title_short |
"En simples physiciens". La perception animale et la connaissance sensible selon Leibniz en 1714 |
title_full |
"En simples physiciens". La perception animale et la connaissance sensible selon Leibniz en 1714 |
title_fullStr |
"En simples physiciens". La perception animale et la connaissance sensible selon Leibniz en 1714 |
title_full_unstemmed |
"En simples physiciens". La perception animale et la connaissance sensible selon Leibniz en 1714 |
title_sort |
"En simples physiciens". La perception animale et la connaissance sensible selon Leibniz en 1714 |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Vargas, Evelyn |
author |
Vargas, Evelyn |
author_facet |
Vargas, Evelyn |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Filosofía Leibniz Principles of Nature and Grace Human perception Animal perception Sensible knowledge |
topic |
Filosofía Leibniz Principles of Nature and Grace Human perception Animal perception Sensible knowledge |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
In his solution to the problem of sensible knowledge, Leibniz seeks to avoid the extreme positions held by the Cartesians and Hobbes. The conceptual distinctions that Leibniz introduces allow him to overcome difficulties raised by his own earlier definitions of sensus. He is consequently able to reconcile the continuity he introduces between animal and human perceptions with the normative and, at the same time, propositional aspects of perceptual judgments. In this paper I will begin by describing his late conception of both human and animal perception, and I will compare this notion with his early notion of perception and the difficulties it gave rise to; finally, I will show the advantages that his new conception can offer for solving the epistemic problem of perception. La solution leibnizienne au problème de la connaissance sensible cherche à éviter les positions extrêmes que les cartésiens et Hobbes ont proposées. Les distinctions conceptuelles que Leibniz introduit lui permettent de surmonter des difficultés suscitées par ses premières définitions du sensus, et, en conséquence, de concilier les continuités entre les perceptions animale et humaine avec les conditions normatives et, pourtant, propositionnelles du jugement perceptuel. Dans cette étude, je commencerai par la description de cette conception tardive de la perception tant humaine qu'animale, et comparerai cette notion avec la première notion de la perception et les difficultés qu'elle suscitefinalement, je présenterai les avantages que la nouvelle conception peut offrir pour le problème épistémique de la perception. Fil: Vargas, Evelyn. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación. Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales (UNLP-CONICET); Argentina. |
description |
In his solution to the problem of sensible knowledge, Leibniz seeks to avoid the extreme positions held by the Cartesians and Hobbes. The conceptual distinctions that Leibniz introduces allow him to overcome difficulties raised by his own earlier definitions of sensus. He is consequently able to reconcile the continuity he introduces between animal and human perceptions with the normative and, at the same time, propositional aspects of perceptual judgments. In this paper I will begin by describing his late conception of both human and animal perception, and I will compare this notion with his early notion of perception and the difficulties it gave rise to; finally, I will show the advantages that his new conception can offer for solving the epistemic problem of perception. |
publishDate |
2019 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2019 |
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article |
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publishedVersion |
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https://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/art_revistas/pr.16638/pr.16638.pdf |
url |
https://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/art_revistas/pr.16638/pr.16638.pdf |
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fra |
language |
fra |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/11336/181374 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.19283/lph-20208.667 |
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openAccess |
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application/pdf |
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Lexicon philosophicum(8), 27-35. (2020) ISSN 2283-783 reponame:Memoria Académica (UNLP-FAHCE) instname:Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación instacron:UNLP |
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Memoria Académica (UNLP-FAHCE) - Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación |
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