What Natural Law Is Not: Distinguishing Natural Law from Other, Related Normativities

Autores
Legarre, Santiago
Año de publicación
2023
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
There has been great confusion around the use of the term ‘natural law.’ Leading authorities avoid using it altogether and the main proponent of natural law theory in English, John Mitchell Finnis, hardly uses it in his writings. ‘Natural law’ in this paper does not mean what it means in three different contexts in which the expression sometimes is used. These contexts are as follows. First, “natural law” as one of the several “natural laws” formerly called “eternal law”. Second, “natural law” as a religious idea, related to the teachings of the Catholic Church. Third, “natural law” as a certain mode of American jurisprudence, which has fallen into great discredit. This paper shall indicate in what respects the meaning that the author holds to be focal has something in common with, and how it differentiates from, the other meanings that prevail in those other contexts. In so doing, this paper will inevitably start to define natural law.
Fil: Legarre, Santiago. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires"; Argentina
Materia
Natural Law
Contexts
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/239203

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spelling What Natural Law Is Not: Distinguishing Natural Law from Other, Related NormativitiesLegarre, SantiagoNatural LawContextshttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5There has been great confusion around the use of the term ‘natural law.’ Leading authorities avoid using it altogether and the main proponent of natural law theory in English, John Mitchell Finnis, hardly uses it in his writings. ‘Natural law’ in this paper does not mean what it means in three different contexts in which the expression sometimes is used. These contexts are as follows. First, “natural law” as one of the several “natural laws” formerly called “eternal law”. Second, “natural law” as a religious idea, related to the teachings of the Catholic Church. Third, “natural law” as a certain mode of American jurisprudence, which has fallen into great discredit. This paper shall indicate in what respects the meaning that the author holds to be focal has something in common with, and how it differentiates from, the other meanings that prevail in those other contexts. In so doing, this paper will inevitably start to define natural law.Fil: Legarre, Santiago. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires"; ArgentinaStrathmore University2023-10info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/239203Legarre, Santiago; What Natural Law Is Not: Distinguishing Natural Law from Other, Related Normativities; Strathmore University; Strathmore Law Journal; 7; 1; 10-2023; 15-232411-59752413-7162CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://journal.strathmore.edu/index.php/law/article/view/243info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.52907/slj.v7i1.243info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-15T15:20:28Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/239203instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-15 15:20:28.449CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv What Natural Law Is Not: Distinguishing Natural Law from Other, Related Normativities
title What Natural Law Is Not: Distinguishing Natural Law from Other, Related Normativities
spellingShingle What Natural Law Is Not: Distinguishing Natural Law from Other, Related Normativities
Legarre, Santiago
Natural Law
Contexts
title_short What Natural Law Is Not: Distinguishing Natural Law from Other, Related Normativities
title_full What Natural Law Is Not: Distinguishing Natural Law from Other, Related Normativities
title_fullStr What Natural Law Is Not: Distinguishing Natural Law from Other, Related Normativities
title_full_unstemmed What Natural Law Is Not: Distinguishing Natural Law from Other, Related Normativities
title_sort What Natural Law Is Not: Distinguishing Natural Law from Other, Related Normativities
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Legarre, Santiago
author Legarre, Santiago
author_facet Legarre, Santiago
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Natural Law
Contexts
topic Natural Law
Contexts
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv There has been great confusion around the use of the term ‘natural law.’ Leading authorities avoid using it altogether and the main proponent of natural law theory in English, John Mitchell Finnis, hardly uses it in his writings. ‘Natural law’ in this paper does not mean what it means in three different contexts in which the expression sometimes is used. These contexts are as follows. First, “natural law” as one of the several “natural laws” formerly called “eternal law”. Second, “natural law” as a religious idea, related to the teachings of the Catholic Church. Third, “natural law” as a certain mode of American jurisprudence, which has fallen into great discredit. This paper shall indicate in what respects the meaning that the author holds to be focal has something in common with, and how it differentiates from, the other meanings that prevail in those other contexts. In so doing, this paper will inevitably start to define natural law.
Fil: Legarre, Santiago. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina "Santa María de los Buenos Aires"; Argentina
description There has been great confusion around the use of the term ‘natural law.’ Leading authorities avoid using it altogether and the main proponent of natural law theory in English, John Mitchell Finnis, hardly uses it in his writings. ‘Natural law’ in this paper does not mean what it means in three different contexts in which the expression sometimes is used. These contexts are as follows. First, “natural law” as one of the several “natural laws” formerly called “eternal law”. Second, “natural law” as a religious idea, related to the teachings of the Catholic Church. Third, “natural law” as a certain mode of American jurisprudence, which has fallen into great discredit. This paper shall indicate in what respects the meaning that the author holds to be focal has something in common with, and how it differentiates from, the other meanings that prevail in those other contexts. In so doing, this paper will inevitably start to define natural law.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-10
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/239203
Legarre, Santiago; What Natural Law Is Not: Distinguishing Natural Law from Other, Related Normativities; Strathmore University; Strathmore Law Journal; 7; 1; 10-2023; 15-23
2411-5975
2413-7162
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/239203
identifier_str_mv Legarre, Santiago; What Natural Law Is Not: Distinguishing Natural Law from Other, Related Normativities; Strathmore University; Strathmore Law Journal; 7; 1; 10-2023; 15-23
2411-5975
2413-7162
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://journal.strathmore.edu/index.php/law/article/view/243
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.52907/slj.v7i1.243
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Strathmore University
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Strathmore University
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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