Effort rights-based management

Autores
Squirels, Dale; Mauder, Mark; Allen, Robin; Andersen, Peder; Astorkiza, Kepa; Butterworth, Douglas; Caballero, Gonzalo; Clarke, Raymond; Ellefsen, Hans; Guillotreau, Patrice; Hampton, John; Hannesson, Rognvaldu; Havice, Elizabeth; Helvey, Mark; Herrick, Samuel; Hoydal, Kjartan; Maharaj, Vishwanie; Metzner, Rebecca; Mosqueira, Iago; Parma, Ana María; Prieto Bowen, Ivan; Restrepo, Victor; Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi; Steinsham, Stein Ivar; Thunberg, Eric; del Valle, Ikerne; Vestergaard, Niels
Año de publicación
2016
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM isdiscussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by-catch and the ecosystem.
Fil: Squirels, Dale. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados Unidos
Fil: Mauder, Mark. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission; Estados Unidos
Fil: Allen, Robin. International Seafood Sustainability Foundation; Nueva Zelanda
Fil: Andersen, Peder. Universidad de Copenhagen; Dinamarca
Fil: Astorkiza, Kepa. Universidad del País Vasco; España
Fil: Butterworth, Douglas. University of Cape Town; Sudáfrica
Fil: Caballero, Gonzalo. Universidad de Vigo; España
Fil: Clarke, Raymond. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados Unidos
Fil: Ellefsen, Hans. University of Faroe Islands; Islas Feroe
Fil: Guillotreau, Patrice. Universite de Nantes; Francia
Fil: Hampton, John. Oceanic Fisheries Programme; Nueva Caledonia
Fil: Hannesson, Rognvaldu. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration; Noruega
Fil: Havice, Elizabeth. University of North Carolina; Estados Unidos
Fil: Helvey, Mark. San Diego; Estados Unidos
Fil: Herrick, Samuel. No especifíca;
Fil: Hoydal, Kjartan. No especifíca;
Fil: Maharaj, Vishwanie. World Wildlife Fund-Fisheries; Estados Unidos
Fil: Metzner, Rebecca. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; Italia
Fil: Mosqueira, Iago. Maritime Affairs Unit of the European Commission Joint Research Center; Italia
Fil: Parma, Ana María. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Centro Nacional Patagónico; Argentina
Fil: Prieto Bowen, Ivan. No especifíca;
Fil: Restrepo, Victor. International Seafood Sustainability Foundation; España
Fil: Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi. Universiti Putra Malaysia; Malasia
Fil: Steinsham, Stein Ivar. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration; Noruega
Fil: Thunberg, Eric. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados Unidos
Fil: del Valle, Ikerne. Universidad del País Vasco; España
Fil: Vestergaard, Niels. University of Southern Denmark; Dinamarca
Materia
Catch Rights
Effort Rights
Fisheries Management
Total Allowable Catch
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/152990

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oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/152990
network_acronym_str CONICETDig
repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Effort rights-based managementSquirels, DaleMauder, MarkAllen, RobinAndersen, PederAstorkiza, KepaButterworth, DouglasCaballero, GonzaloClarke, RaymondEllefsen, HansGuillotreau, PatriceHampton, JohnHannesson, RognvalduHavice, ElizabethHelvey, MarkHerrick, SamuelHoydal, KjartanMaharaj, VishwanieMetzner, RebeccaMosqueira, IagoParma, Ana MaríaPrieto Bowen, IvanRestrepo, VictorSidique, Shaufique FahmiSteinsham, Stein IvarThunberg, Ericdel Valle, IkerneVestergaard, NielsCatch RightsEffort RightsFisheries ManagementTotal Allowable Catchhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/4.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/4Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM isdiscussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by-catch and the ecosystem.Fil: Squirels, Dale. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados UnidosFil: Mauder, Mark. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission; Estados UnidosFil: Allen, Robin. International Seafood Sustainability Foundation; Nueva ZelandaFil: Andersen, Peder. Universidad de Copenhagen; DinamarcaFil: Astorkiza, Kepa. Universidad del País Vasco; EspañaFil: Butterworth, Douglas. University of Cape Town; SudáfricaFil: Caballero, Gonzalo. Universidad de Vigo; EspañaFil: Clarke, Raymond. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados UnidosFil: Ellefsen, Hans. University of Faroe Islands; Islas FeroeFil: Guillotreau, Patrice. Universite de Nantes; FranciaFil: Hampton, John. Oceanic Fisheries Programme; Nueva CaledoniaFil: Hannesson, Rognvaldu. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration; NoruegaFil: Havice, Elizabeth. University of North Carolina; Estados UnidosFil: Helvey, Mark. San Diego; Estados UnidosFil: Herrick, Samuel. No especifíca;Fil: Hoydal, Kjartan. No especifíca;Fil: Maharaj, Vishwanie. World Wildlife Fund-Fisheries; Estados UnidosFil: Metzner, Rebecca. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; ItaliaFil: Mosqueira, Iago. Maritime Affairs Unit of the European Commission Joint Research Center; ItaliaFil: Parma, Ana María. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Centro Nacional Patagónico; ArgentinaFil: Prieto Bowen, Ivan. No especifíca;Fil: Restrepo, Victor. International Seafood Sustainability Foundation; EspañaFil: Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi. Universiti Putra Malaysia; MalasiaFil: Steinsham, Stein Ivar. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration; NoruegaFil: Thunberg, Eric. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados UnidosFil: del Valle, Ikerne. Universidad del País Vasco; EspañaFil: Vestergaard, Niels. University of Southern Denmark; DinamarcaWiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc2016-08info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/152990Squirels, Dale; Mauder, Mark; Allen, Robin; Andersen, Peder; Astorkiza, Kepa; et al.; Effort rights-based management; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Fish And Fisheries; 18; 3; 8-2016; 440-4651467-2960CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/faf.12185info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/faf.12185/abstractinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:38:40Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/152990instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:38:41.255CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Effort rights-based management
title Effort rights-based management
spellingShingle Effort rights-based management
Squirels, Dale
Catch Rights
Effort Rights
Fisheries Management
Total Allowable Catch
title_short Effort rights-based management
title_full Effort rights-based management
title_fullStr Effort rights-based management
title_full_unstemmed Effort rights-based management
title_sort Effort rights-based management
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Squirels, Dale
Mauder, Mark
Allen, Robin
Andersen, Peder
Astorkiza, Kepa
Butterworth, Douglas
Caballero, Gonzalo
Clarke, Raymond
Ellefsen, Hans
Guillotreau, Patrice
Hampton, John
Hannesson, Rognvaldu
Havice, Elizabeth
Helvey, Mark
Herrick, Samuel
Hoydal, Kjartan
Maharaj, Vishwanie
Metzner, Rebecca
Mosqueira, Iago
Parma, Ana María
Prieto Bowen, Ivan
Restrepo, Victor
Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi
Steinsham, Stein Ivar
Thunberg, Eric
del Valle, Ikerne
Vestergaard, Niels
author Squirels, Dale
author_facet Squirels, Dale
Mauder, Mark
Allen, Robin
Andersen, Peder
Astorkiza, Kepa
Butterworth, Douglas
Caballero, Gonzalo
Clarke, Raymond
Ellefsen, Hans
Guillotreau, Patrice
Hampton, John
Hannesson, Rognvaldu
Havice, Elizabeth
Helvey, Mark
Herrick, Samuel
Hoydal, Kjartan
Maharaj, Vishwanie
Metzner, Rebecca
Mosqueira, Iago
Parma, Ana María
Prieto Bowen, Ivan
Restrepo, Victor
Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi
Steinsham, Stein Ivar
Thunberg, Eric
del Valle, Ikerne
Vestergaard, Niels
author_role author
author2 Mauder, Mark
Allen, Robin
Andersen, Peder
Astorkiza, Kepa
Butterworth, Douglas
Caballero, Gonzalo
Clarke, Raymond
Ellefsen, Hans
Guillotreau, Patrice
Hampton, John
Hannesson, Rognvaldu
Havice, Elizabeth
Helvey, Mark
Herrick, Samuel
Hoydal, Kjartan
Maharaj, Vishwanie
Metzner, Rebecca
Mosqueira, Iago
Parma, Ana María
Prieto Bowen, Ivan
Restrepo, Victor
Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi
Steinsham, Stein Ivar
Thunberg, Eric
del Valle, Ikerne
Vestergaard, Niels
author2_role author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Catch Rights
Effort Rights
Fisheries Management
Total Allowable Catch
topic Catch Rights
Effort Rights
Fisheries Management
Total Allowable Catch
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/4.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/4
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM isdiscussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by-catch and the ecosystem.
Fil: Squirels, Dale. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados Unidos
Fil: Mauder, Mark. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission; Estados Unidos
Fil: Allen, Robin. International Seafood Sustainability Foundation; Nueva Zelanda
Fil: Andersen, Peder. Universidad de Copenhagen; Dinamarca
Fil: Astorkiza, Kepa. Universidad del País Vasco; España
Fil: Butterworth, Douglas. University of Cape Town; Sudáfrica
Fil: Caballero, Gonzalo. Universidad de Vigo; España
Fil: Clarke, Raymond. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados Unidos
Fil: Ellefsen, Hans. University of Faroe Islands; Islas Feroe
Fil: Guillotreau, Patrice. Universite de Nantes; Francia
Fil: Hampton, John. Oceanic Fisheries Programme; Nueva Caledonia
Fil: Hannesson, Rognvaldu. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration; Noruega
Fil: Havice, Elizabeth. University of North Carolina; Estados Unidos
Fil: Helvey, Mark. San Diego; Estados Unidos
Fil: Herrick, Samuel. No especifíca;
Fil: Hoydal, Kjartan. No especifíca;
Fil: Maharaj, Vishwanie. World Wildlife Fund-Fisheries; Estados Unidos
Fil: Metzner, Rebecca. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; Italia
Fil: Mosqueira, Iago. Maritime Affairs Unit of the European Commission Joint Research Center; Italia
Fil: Parma, Ana María. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Centro Nacional Patagónico; Argentina
Fil: Prieto Bowen, Ivan. No especifíca;
Fil: Restrepo, Victor. International Seafood Sustainability Foundation; España
Fil: Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi. Universiti Putra Malaysia; Malasia
Fil: Steinsham, Stein Ivar. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration; Noruega
Fil: Thunberg, Eric. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados Unidos
Fil: del Valle, Ikerne. Universidad del País Vasco; España
Fil: Vestergaard, Niels. University of Southern Denmark; Dinamarca
description Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM isdiscussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by-catch and the ecosystem.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-08
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/152990
Squirels, Dale; Mauder, Mark; Allen, Robin; Andersen, Peder; Astorkiza, Kepa; et al.; Effort rights-based management; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Fish And Fisheries; 18; 3; 8-2016; 440-465
1467-2960
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/152990
identifier_str_mv Squirels, Dale; Mauder, Mark; Allen, Robin; Andersen, Peder; Astorkiza, Kepa; et al.; Effort rights-based management; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Fish And Fisheries; 18; 3; 8-2016; 440-465
1467-2960
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/faf.12185
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/faf.12185/abstract
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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