Effort rights-based management
- Autores
- Squirels, Dale; Mauder, Mark; Allen, Robin; Andersen, Peder; Astorkiza, Kepa; Butterworth, Douglas; Caballero, Gonzalo; Clarke, Raymond; Ellefsen, Hans; Guillotreau, Patrice; Hampton, John; Hannesson, Rognvaldu; Havice, Elizabeth; Helvey, Mark; Herrick, Samuel; Hoydal, Kjartan; Maharaj, Vishwanie; Metzner, Rebecca; Mosqueira, Iago; Parma, Ana María; Prieto Bowen, Ivan; Restrepo, Victor; Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi; Steinsham, Stein Ivar; Thunberg, Eric; del Valle, Ikerne; Vestergaard, Niels
- Año de publicación
- 2016
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM isdiscussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by-catch and the ecosystem.
Fil: Squirels, Dale. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados Unidos
Fil: Mauder, Mark. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission; Estados Unidos
Fil: Allen, Robin. International Seafood Sustainability Foundation; Nueva Zelanda
Fil: Andersen, Peder. Universidad de Copenhagen; Dinamarca
Fil: Astorkiza, Kepa. Universidad del País Vasco; España
Fil: Butterworth, Douglas. University of Cape Town; Sudáfrica
Fil: Caballero, Gonzalo. Universidad de Vigo; España
Fil: Clarke, Raymond. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados Unidos
Fil: Ellefsen, Hans. University of Faroe Islands; Islas Feroe
Fil: Guillotreau, Patrice. Universite de Nantes; Francia
Fil: Hampton, John. Oceanic Fisheries Programme; Nueva Caledonia
Fil: Hannesson, Rognvaldu. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration; Noruega
Fil: Havice, Elizabeth. University of North Carolina; Estados Unidos
Fil: Helvey, Mark. San Diego; Estados Unidos
Fil: Herrick, Samuel. No especifíca;
Fil: Hoydal, Kjartan. No especifíca;
Fil: Maharaj, Vishwanie. World Wildlife Fund-Fisheries; Estados Unidos
Fil: Metzner, Rebecca. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; Italia
Fil: Mosqueira, Iago. Maritime Affairs Unit of the European Commission Joint Research Center; Italia
Fil: Parma, Ana María. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Centro Nacional Patagónico; Argentina
Fil: Prieto Bowen, Ivan. No especifíca;
Fil: Restrepo, Victor. International Seafood Sustainability Foundation; España
Fil: Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi. Universiti Putra Malaysia; Malasia
Fil: Steinsham, Stein Ivar. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration; Noruega
Fil: Thunberg, Eric. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados Unidos
Fil: del Valle, Ikerne. Universidad del País Vasco; España
Fil: Vestergaard, Niels. University of Southern Denmark; Dinamarca - Materia
-
Catch Rights
Effort Rights
Fisheries Management
Total Allowable Catch - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/152990
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/152990 |
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CONICETDig |
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3498 |
network_name_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
spelling |
Effort rights-based managementSquirels, DaleMauder, MarkAllen, RobinAndersen, PederAstorkiza, KepaButterworth, DouglasCaballero, GonzaloClarke, RaymondEllefsen, HansGuillotreau, PatriceHampton, JohnHannesson, RognvalduHavice, ElizabethHelvey, MarkHerrick, SamuelHoydal, KjartanMaharaj, VishwanieMetzner, RebeccaMosqueira, IagoParma, Ana MaríaPrieto Bowen, IvanRestrepo, VictorSidique, Shaufique FahmiSteinsham, Stein IvarThunberg, Ericdel Valle, IkerneVestergaard, NielsCatch RightsEffort RightsFisheries ManagementTotal Allowable Catchhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/4.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/4Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM isdiscussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by-catch and the ecosystem.Fil: Squirels, Dale. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados UnidosFil: Mauder, Mark. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission; Estados UnidosFil: Allen, Robin. International Seafood Sustainability Foundation; Nueva ZelandaFil: Andersen, Peder. Universidad de Copenhagen; DinamarcaFil: Astorkiza, Kepa. Universidad del País Vasco; EspañaFil: Butterworth, Douglas. University of Cape Town; SudáfricaFil: Caballero, Gonzalo. Universidad de Vigo; EspañaFil: Clarke, Raymond. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados UnidosFil: Ellefsen, Hans. University of Faroe Islands; Islas FeroeFil: Guillotreau, Patrice. Universite de Nantes; FranciaFil: Hampton, John. Oceanic Fisheries Programme; Nueva CaledoniaFil: Hannesson, Rognvaldu. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration; NoruegaFil: Havice, Elizabeth. University of North Carolina; Estados UnidosFil: Helvey, Mark. San Diego; Estados UnidosFil: Herrick, Samuel. No especifíca;Fil: Hoydal, Kjartan. No especifíca;Fil: Maharaj, Vishwanie. World Wildlife Fund-Fisheries; Estados UnidosFil: Metzner, Rebecca. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; ItaliaFil: Mosqueira, Iago. Maritime Affairs Unit of the European Commission Joint Research Center; ItaliaFil: Parma, Ana María. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Centro Nacional Patagónico; ArgentinaFil: Prieto Bowen, Ivan. No especifíca;Fil: Restrepo, Victor. International Seafood Sustainability Foundation; EspañaFil: Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi. Universiti Putra Malaysia; MalasiaFil: Steinsham, Stein Ivar. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration; NoruegaFil: Thunberg, Eric. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados UnidosFil: del Valle, Ikerne. Universidad del País Vasco; EspañaFil: Vestergaard, Niels. University of Southern Denmark; DinamarcaWiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc2016-08info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/152990Squirels, Dale; Mauder, Mark; Allen, Robin; Andersen, Peder; Astorkiza, Kepa; et al.; Effort rights-based management; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Fish And Fisheries; 18; 3; 8-2016; 440-4651467-2960CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/faf.12185info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/faf.12185/abstractinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:38:40Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/152990instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:38:41.255CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Effort rights-based management |
title |
Effort rights-based management |
spellingShingle |
Effort rights-based management Squirels, Dale Catch Rights Effort Rights Fisheries Management Total Allowable Catch |
title_short |
Effort rights-based management |
title_full |
Effort rights-based management |
title_fullStr |
Effort rights-based management |
title_full_unstemmed |
Effort rights-based management |
title_sort |
Effort rights-based management |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Squirels, Dale Mauder, Mark Allen, Robin Andersen, Peder Astorkiza, Kepa Butterworth, Douglas Caballero, Gonzalo Clarke, Raymond Ellefsen, Hans Guillotreau, Patrice Hampton, John Hannesson, Rognvaldu Havice, Elizabeth Helvey, Mark Herrick, Samuel Hoydal, Kjartan Maharaj, Vishwanie Metzner, Rebecca Mosqueira, Iago Parma, Ana María Prieto Bowen, Ivan Restrepo, Victor Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi Steinsham, Stein Ivar Thunberg, Eric del Valle, Ikerne Vestergaard, Niels |
author |
Squirels, Dale |
author_facet |
Squirels, Dale Mauder, Mark Allen, Robin Andersen, Peder Astorkiza, Kepa Butterworth, Douglas Caballero, Gonzalo Clarke, Raymond Ellefsen, Hans Guillotreau, Patrice Hampton, John Hannesson, Rognvaldu Havice, Elizabeth Helvey, Mark Herrick, Samuel Hoydal, Kjartan Maharaj, Vishwanie Metzner, Rebecca Mosqueira, Iago Parma, Ana María Prieto Bowen, Ivan Restrepo, Victor Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi Steinsham, Stein Ivar Thunberg, Eric del Valle, Ikerne Vestergaard, Niels |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Mauder, Mark Allen, Robin Andersen, Peder Astorkiza, Kepa Butterworth, Douglas Caballero, Gonzalo Clarke, Raymond Ellefsen, Hans Guillotreau, Patrice Hampton, John Hannesson, Rognvaldu Havice, Elizabeth Helvey, Mark Herrick, Samuel Hoydal, Kjartan Maharaj, Vishwanie Metzner, Rebecca Mosqueira, Iago Parma, Ana María Prieto Bowen, Ivan Restrepo, Victor Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi Steinsham, Stein Ivar Thunberg, Eric del Valle, Ikerne Vestergaard, Niels |
author2_role |
author author author author author author author author author author author author author author author author author author author author author author author author author author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Catch Rights Effort Rights Fisheries Management Total Allowable Catch |
topic |
Catch Rights Effort Rights Fisheries Management Total Allowable Catch |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/4.1 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/4 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM isdiscussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by-catch and the ecosystem. Fil: Squirels, Dale. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados Unidos Fil: Mauder, Mark. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission; Estados Unidos Fil: Allen, Robin. International Seafood Sustainability Foundation; Nueva Zelanda Fil: Andersen, Peder. Universidad de Copenhagen; Dinamarca Fil: Astorkiza, Kepa. Universidad del País Vasco; España Fil: Butterworth, Douglas. University of Cape Town; Sudáfrica Fil: Caballero, Gonzalo. Universidad de Vigo; España Fil: Clarke, Raymond. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados Unidos Fil: Ellefsen, Hans. University of Faroe Islands; Islas Feroe Fil: Guillotreau, Patrice. Universite de Nantes; Francia Fil: Hampton, John. Oceanic Fisheries Programme; Nueva Caledonia Fil: Hannesson, Rognvaldu. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration; Noruega Fil: Havice, Elizabeth. University of North Carolina; Estados Unidos Fil: Helvey, Mark. San Diego; Estados Unidos Fil: Herrick, Samuel. No especifíca; Fil: Hoydal, Kjartan. No especifíca; Fil: Maharaj, Vishwanie. World Wildlife Fund-Fisheries; Estados Unidos Fil: Metzner, Rebecca. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; Italia Fil: Mosqueira, Iago. Maritime Affairs Unit of the European Commission Joint Research Center; Italia Fil: Parma, Ana María. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Centro Nacional Patagónico; Argentina Fil: Prieto Bowen, Ivan. No especifíca; Fil: Restrepo, Victor. International Seafood Sustainability Foundation; España Fil: Sidique, Shaufique Fahmi. Universiti Putra Malaysia; Malasia Fil: Steinsham, Stein Ivar. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration; Noruega Fil: Thunberg, Eric. National Marine Fisheries Service; Estados Unidos Fil: del Valle, Ikerne. Universidad del País Vasco; España Fil: Vestergaard, Niels. University of Southern Denmark; Dinamarca |
description |
Effort rights-based fisheries management (RBM) is less widely used than catch rights, whether for groups or individuals. Because RBM on catch or effort necessarily requires a total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE), RBM isdiscussed in conjunction with issues in assessing fish populations and providing TACs or TAEs. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and there are trade-offs between the two approaches. In a narrow economic sense, catch rights are superior because of the type of incentives created, but once the costs of research to improve stock assessments and the associated risks of determining the TAC and costs of monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement are taken into consideration, the choice between catch or effort RBM becomes more complex and less clear. The results will be case specific. Hybrid systems based on both catch and effort are increasingly employed to manage marine fisheries to capture the advantages of both approaches. In hybrid systems, catch or effort RBM dominates and controls on the other supplements. RBM using either catch or effort by itself addresses only the target species stock externality and not the remaining externalities associated with by-catch and the ecosystem. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-08 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/152990 Squirels, Dale; Mauder, Mark; Allen, Robin; Andersen, Peder; Astorkiza, Kepa; et al.; Effort rights-based management; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Fish And Fisheries; 18; 3; 8-2016; 440-465 1467-2960 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/152990 |
identifier_str_mv |
Squirels, Dale; Mauder, Mark; Allen, Robin; Andersen, Peder; Astorkiza, Kepa; et al.; Effort rights-based management; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Fish And Fisheries; 18; 3; 8-2016; 440-465 1467-2960 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/faf.12185 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/faf.12185/abstract |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
reponame_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
collection |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
instname_str |
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
_version_ |
1844613223559462912 |
score |
13.070432 |