Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa
- Autores
- O'Brien, Siobhán; Lujan, Adela Maria; Paterson, Steve; Cant, Michael; Buckling, Angus
- Año de publicación
- 2017
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- Cooperation in nature is ubiquitous, but is susceptible to social cheats who pay little or no cost of cooperation yet reap the benefits. The effect such cheats have on reducing population productivity suggests that there is selection for cooperators to mitigate the adverse effects of cheats. While mechanisms have been elucidated for scenarios involving a direct association between producer and cooperative product, it is less clear how cooperators may suppress cheating in an anonymous public goods scenario, where cheats cannot be directly identified. Here, we investigate the real-time evolutionary response of cooperators to cheats when cooperation is mediated by a diffusible public good: the production of iron-scavenging siderophores by Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We find that siderophore producers evolved in the presence of a high frequency of non-producing cheats were fitter in the presence of cheats, at no obvious cost to population productivity. A novel morphotype independently evolved and reached higher frequencies in cheat-adapted versus control populations, exhibiting reduced siderophore production but increased production of pyocyanin—an extracellular toxin that can also increase the availability of soluble iron. This suggests that cooperators may have mitigated the negative effects of cheats by downregulating siderophore production and upregulat-ing an alternative iron-acquisition public good. More generally, the study emphasizes that cooperating organisms can rapidly adapt to the presence of anonymous cheats without necessarily incurring fitness costs in the environment they evolve in.
Fil: O'Brien, Siobhán. Center for Adaptation to a Changing Environment; Suiza
Fil: Lujan, Adela Maria. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones en Química Biológica de Córdoba. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Químicas. Centro de Investigaciones en Química Biológica de Córdoba; Argentina
Fil: Paterson, Steve. University of Liverpool; Reino Unido
Fil: Cant, Michael. College of Life and Environmental Sciences; Reino Unido
Fil: Buckling, Angus. Environment and Sustainability Institute Uoe; Reino Unido. University of Exeter; Reino Unido - Materia
-
COOPERATION
EXPERIMENTAL EVOLUTION
PSEUDOMONAS
PUBLIC GOODS
PYOVERDINE
SIDEROPHORE - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
.jpg)
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/59866
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosaO'Brien, SiobhánLujan, Adela MariaPaterson, SteveCant, MichaelBuckling, AngusCOOPERATIONEXPERIMENTAL EVOLUTIONPSEUDOMONASPUBLIC GOODSPYOVERDINESIDEROPHOREhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.6https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1Cooperation in nature is ubiquitous, but is susceptible to social cheats who pay little or no cost of cooperation yet reap the benefits. The effect such cheats have on reducing population productivity suggests that there is selection for cooperators to mitigate the adverse effects of cheats. While mechanisms have been elucidated for scenarios involving a direct association between producer and cooperative product, it is less clear how cooperators may suppress cheating in an anonymous public goods scenario, where cheats cannot be directly identified. Here, we investigate the real-time evolutionary response of cooperators to cheats when cooperation is mediated by a diffusible public good: the production of iron-scavenging siderophores by Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We find that siderophore producers evolved in the presence of a high frequency of non-producing cheats were fitter in the presence of cheats, at no obvious cost to population productivity. A novel morphotype independently evolved and reached higher frequencies in cheat-adapted versus control populations, exhibiting reduced siderophore production but increased production of pyocyanin—an extracellular toxin that can also increase the availability of soluble iron. This suggests that cooperators may have mitigated the negative effects of cheats by downregulating siderophore production and upregulat-ing an alternative iron-acquisition public good. More generally, the study emphasizes that cooperating organisms can rapidly adapt to the presence of anonymous cheats without necessarily incurring fitness costs in the environment they evolve in.Fil: O'Brien, Siobhán. Center for Adaptation to a Changing Environment; SuizaFil: Lujan, Adela Maria. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones en Química Biológica de Córdoba. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Químicas. Centro de Investigaciones en Química Biológica de Córdoba; ArgentinaFil: Paterson, Steve. University of Liverpool; Reino UnidoFil: Cant, Michael. College of Life and Environmental Sciences; Reino UnidoFil: Buckling, Angus. Environment and Sustainability Institute Uoe; Reino Unido. University of Exeter; Reino UnidoThe Royal Society2017-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/59866O'Brien, Siobhán; Lujan, Adela Maria; Paterson, Steve; Cant, Michael; Buckling, Angus; Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa; The Royal Society; Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences; 284; 1859; 7-2017; 1-80962-84521471-2954CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/lookup/doi/10.1098/rspb.2017.1089info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1098/rspb.2017.1089info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-11-26T08:50:35Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/59866instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-11-26 08:50:35.296CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa |
| title |
Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa |
| spellingShingle |
Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa O'Brien, Siobhán COOPERATION EXPERIMENTAL EVOLUTION PSEUDOMONAS PUBLIC GOODS PYOVERDINE SIDEROPHORE |
| title_short |
Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa |
| title_full |
Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa |
| title_fullStr |
Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa |
| title_sort |
Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
O'Brien, Siobhán Lujan, Adela Maria Paterson, Steve Cant, Michael Buckling, Angus |
| author |
O'Brien, Siobhán |
| author_facet |
O'Brien, Siobhán Lujan, Adela Maria Paterson, Steve Cant, Michael Buckling, Angus |
| author_role |
author |
| author2 |
Lujan, Adela Maria Paterson, Steve Cant, Michael Buckling, Angus |
| author2_role |
author author author author |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
COOPERATION EXPERIMENTAL EVOLUTION PSEUDOMONAS PUBLIC GOODS PYOVERDINE SIDEROPHORE |
| topic |
COOPERATION EXPERIMENTAL EVOLUTION PSEUDOMONAS PUBLIC GOODS PYOVERDINE SIDEROPHORE |
| purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.6 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1 |
| dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
Cooperation in nature is ubiquitous, but is susceptible to social cheats who pay little or no cost of cooperation yet reap the benefits. The effect such cheats have on reducing population productivity suggests that there is selection for cooperators to mitigate the adverse effects of cheats. While mechanisms have been elucidated for scenarios involving a direct association between producer and cooperative product, it is less clear how cooperators may suppress cheating in an anonymous public goods scenario, where cheats cannot be directly identified. Here, we investigate the real-time evolutionary response of cooperators to cheats when cooperation is mediated by a diffusible public good: the production of iron-scavenging siderophores by Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We find that siderophore producers evolved in the presence of a high frequency of non-producing cheats were fitter in the presence of cheats, at no obvious cost to population productivity. A novel morphotype independently evolved and reached higher frequencies in cheat-adapted versus control populations, exhibiting reduced siderophore production but increased production of pyocyanin—an extracellular toxin that can also increase the availability of soluble iron. This suggests that cooperators may have mitigated the negative effects of cheats by downregulating siderophore production and upregulat-ing an alternative iron-acquisition public good. More generally, the study emphasizes that cooperating organisms can rapidly adapt to the presence of anonymous cheats without necessarily incurring fitness costs in the environment they evolve in. Fil: O'Brien, Siobhán. Center for Adaptation to a Changing Environment; Suiza Fil: Lujan, Adela Maria. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones en Química Biológica de Córdoba. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Químicas. Centro de Investigaciones en Química Biológica de Córdoba; Argentina Fil: Paterson, Steve. University of Liverpool; Reino Unido Fil: Cant, Michael. College of Life and Environmental Sciences; Reino Unido Fil: Buckling, Angus. Environment and Sustainability Institute Uoe; Reino Unido. University of Exeter; Reino Unido |
| description |
Cooperation in nature is ubiquitous, but is susceptible to social cheats who pay little or no cost of cooperation yet reap the benefits. The effect such cheats have on reducing population productivity suggests that there is selection for cooperators to mitigate the adverse effects of cheats. While mechanisms have been elucidated for scenarios involving a direct association between producer and cooperative product, it is less clear how cooperators may suppress cheating in an anonymous public goods scenario, where cheats cannot be directly identified. Here, we investigate the real-time evolutionary response of cooperators to cheats when cooperation is mediated by a diffusible public good: the production of iron-scavenging siderophores by Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We find that siderophore producers evolved in the presence of a high frequency of non-producing cheats were fitter in the presence of cheats, at no obvious cost to population productivity. A novel morphotype independently evolved and reached higher frequencies in cheat-adapted versus control populations, exhibiting reduced siderophore production but increased production of pyocyanin—an extracellular toxin that can also increase the availability of soluble iron. This suggests that cooperators may have mitigated the negative effects of cheats by downregulating siderophore production and upregulat-ing an alternative iron-acquisition public good. More generally, the study emphasizes that cooperating organisms can rapidly adapt to the presence of anonymous cheats without necessarily incurring fitness costs in the environment they evolve in. |
| publishDate |
2017 |
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2017-07 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/11336/59866 O'Brien, Siobhán; Lujan, Adela Maria; Paterson, Steve; Cant, Michael; Buckling, Angus; Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa; The Royal Society; Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences; 284; 1859; 7-2017; 1-8 0962-8452 1471-2954 CONICET Digital CONICET |
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http://hdl.handle.net/11336/59866 |
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O'Brien, Siobhán; Lujan, Adela Maria; Paterson, Steve; Cant, Michael; Buckling, Angus; Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa; The Royal Society; Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences; 284; 1859; 7-2017; 1-8 0962-8452 1471-2954 CONICET Digital CONICET |
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eng |
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