Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa

Autores
O'Brien, Siobhán; Lujan, Adela Maria; Paterson, Steve; Cant, Michael; Buckling, Angus
Año de publicación
2017
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Cooperation in nature is ubiquitous, but is susceptible to social cheats who pay little or no cost of cooperation yet reap the benefits. The effect such cheats have on reducing population productivity suggests that there is selection for cooperators to mitigate the adverse effects of cheats. While mechanisms have been elucidated for scenarios involving a direct association between producer and cooperative product, it is less clear how cooperators may suppress cheating in an anonymous public goods scenario, where cheats cannot be directly identified. Here, we investigate the real-time evolutionary response of cooperators to cheats when cooperation is mediated by a diffusible public good: the production of iron-scavenging siderophores by Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We find that siderophore producers evolved in the presence of a high frequency of non-producing cheats were fitter in the presence of cheats, at no obvious cost to population productivity. A novel morphotype independently evolved and reached higher frequencies in cheat-adapted versus control populations, exhibiting reduced siderophore production but increased production of pyocyanin—an extracellular toxin that can also increase the availability of soluble iron. This suggests that cooperators may have mitigated the negative effects of cheats by downregulating siderophore production and upregulat-ing an alternative iron-acquisition public good. More generally, the study emphasizes that cooperating organisms can rapidly adapt to the presence of anonymous cheats without necessarily incurring fitness costs in the environment they evolve in.
Fil: O'Brien, Siobhán. Center for Adaptation to a Changing Environment; Suiza
Fil: Lujan, Adela Maria. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones en Química Biológica de Córdoba. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Químicas. Centro de Investigaciones en Química Biológica de Córdoba; Argentina
Fil: Paterson, Steve. University of Liverpool; Reino Unido
Fil: Cant, Michael. College of Life and Environmental Sciences; Reino Unido
Fil: Buckling, Angus. Environment and Sustainability Institute Uoe; Reino Unido. University of Exeter; Reino Unido
Materia
COOPERATION
EXPERIMENTAL EVOLUTION
PSEUDOMONAS
PUBLIC GOODS
PYOVERDINE
SIDEROPHORE
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/59866

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spelling Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosaO'Brien, SiobhánLujan, Adela MariaPaterson, SteveCant, MichaelBuckling, AngusCOOPERATIONEXPERIMENTAL EVOLUTIONPSEUDOMONASPUBLIC GOODSPYOVERDINESIDEROPHOREhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.6https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1Cooperation in nature is ubiquitous, but is susceptible to social cheats who pay little or no cost of cooperation yet reap the benefits. The effect such cheats have on reducing population productivity suggests that there is selection for cooperators to mitigate the adverse effects of cheats. While mechanisms have been elucidated for scenarios involving a direct association between producer and cooperative product, it is less clear how cooperators may suppress cheating in an anonymous public goods scenario, where cheats cannot be directly identified. Here, we investigate the real-time evolutionary response of cooperators to cheats when cooperation is mediated by a diffusible public good: the production of iron-scavenging siderophores by Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We find that siderophore producers evolved in the presence of a high frequency of non-producing cheats were fitter in the presence of cheats, at no obvious cost to population productivity. A novel morphotype independently evolved and reached higher frequencies in cheat-adapted versus control populations, exhibiting reduced siderophore production but increased production of pyocyanin—an extracellular toxin that can also increase the availability of soluble iron. This suggests that cooperators may have mitigated the negative effects of cheats by downregulating siderophore production and upregulat-ing an alternative iron-acquisition public good. More generally, the study emphasizes that cooperating organisms can rapidly adapt to the presence of anonymous cheats without necessarily incurring fitness costs in the environment they evolve in.Fil: O'Brien, Siobhán. Center for Adaptation to a Changing Environment; SuizaFil: Lujan, Adela Maria. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones en Química Biológica de Córdoba. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Químicas. Centro de Investigaciones en Química Biológica de Córdoba; ArgentinaFil: Paterson, Steve. University of Liverpool; Reino UnidoFil: Cant, Michael. College of Life and Environmental Sciences; Reino UnidoFil: Buckling, Angus. Environment and Sustainability Institute Uoe; Reino Unido. University of Exeter; Reino UnidoThe Royal Society2017-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/59866O'Brien, Siobhán; Lujan, Adela Maria; Paterson, Steve; Cant, Michael; Buckling, Angus; Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa; The Royal Society; Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences; 284; 1859; 7-2017; 1-80962-84521471-2954CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/lookup/doi/10.1098/rspb.2017.1089info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1098/rspb.2017.1089info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-11-26T08:50:35Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/59866instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-11-26 08:50:35.296CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa
title Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa
spellingShingle Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa
O'Brien, Siobhán
COOPERATION
EXPERIMENTAL EVOLUTION
PSEUDOMONAS
PUBLIC GOODS
PYOVERDINE
SIDEROPHORE
title_short Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa
title_full Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa
title_fullStr Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa
title_full_unstemmed Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa
title_sort Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv O'Brien, Siobhán
Lujan, Adela Maria
Paterson, Steve
Cant, Michael
Buckling, Angus
author O'Brien, Siobhán
author_facet O'Brien, Siobhán
Lujan, Adela Maria
Paterson, Steve
Cant, Michael
Buckling, Angus
author_role author
author2 Lujan, Adela Maria
Paterson, Steve
Cant, Michael
Buckling, Angus
author2_role author
author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv COOPERATION
EXPERIMENTAL EVOLUTION
PSEUDOMONAS
PUBLIC GOODS
PYOVERDINE
SIDEROPHORE
topic COOPERATION
EXPERIMENTAL EVOLUTION
PSEUDOMONAS
PUBLIC GOODS
PYOVERDINE
SIDEROPHORE
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.6
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Cooperation in nature is ubiquitous, but is susceptible to social cheats who pay little or no cost of cooperation yet reap the benefits. The effect such cheats have on reducing population productivity suggests that there is selection for cooperators to mitigate the adverse effects of cheats. While mechanisms have been elucidated for scenarios involving a direct association between producer and cooperative product, it is less clear how cooperators may suppress cheating in an anonymous public goods scenario, where cheats cannot be directly identified. Here, we investigate the real-time evolutionary response of cooperators to cheats when cooperation is mediated by a diffusible public good: the production of iron-scavenging siderophores by Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We find that siderophore producers evolved in the presence of a high frequency of non-producing cheats were fitter in the presence of cheats, at no obvious cost to population productivity. A novel morphotype independently evolved and reached higher frequencies in cheat-adapted versus control populations, exhibiting reduced siderophore production but increased production of pyocyanin—an extracellular toxin that can also increase the availability of soluble iron. This suggests that cooperators may have mitigated the negative effects of cheats by downregulating siderophore production and upregulat-ing an alternative iron-acquisition public good. More generally, the study emphasizes that cooperating organisms can rapidly adapt to the presence of anonymous cheats without necessarily incurring fitness costs in the environment they evolve in.
Fil: O'Brien, Siobhán. Center for Adaptation to a Changing Environment; Suiza
Fil: Lujan, Adela Maria. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones en Química Biológica de Córdoba. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Químicas. Centro de Investigaciones en Química Biológica de Córdoba; Argentina
Fil: Paterson, Steve. University of Liverpool; Reino Unido
Fil: Cant, Michael. College of Life and Environmental Sciences; Reino Unido
Fil: Buckling, Angus. Environment and Sustainability Institute Uoe; Reino Unido. University of Exeter; Reino Unido
description Cooperation in nature is ubiquitous, but is susceptible to social cheats who pay little or no cost of cooperation yet reap the benefits. The effect such cheats have on reducing population productivity suggests that there is selection for cooperators to mitigate the adverse effects of cheats. While mechanisms have been elucidated for scenarios involving a direct association between producer and cooperative product, it is less clear how cooperators may suppress cheating in an anonymous public goods scenario, where cheats cannot be directly identified. Here, we investigate the real-time evolutionary response of cooperators to cheats when cooperation is mediated by a diffusible public good: the production of iron-scavenging siderophores by Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We find that siderophore producers evolved in the presence of a high frequency of non-producing cheats were fitter in the presence of cheats, at no obvious cost to population productivity. A novel morphotype independently evolved and reached higher frequencies in cheat-adapted versus control populations, exhibiting reduced siderophore production but increased production of pyocyanin—an extracellular toxin that can also increase the availability of soluble iron. This suggests that cooperators may have mitigated the negative effects of cheats by downregulating siderophore production and upregulat-ing an alternative iron-acquisition public good. More generally, the study emphasizes that cooperating organisms can rapidly adapt to the presence of anonymous cheats without necessarily incurring fitness costs in the environment they evolve in.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-07
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/59866
O'Brien, Siobhán; Lujan, Adela Maria; Paterson, Steve; Cant, Michael; Buckling, Angus; Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa; The Royal Society; Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences; 284; 1859; 7-2017; 1-8
0962-8452
1471-2954
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/59866
identifier_str_mv O'Brien, Siobhán; Lujan, Adela Maria; Paterson, Steve; Cant, Michael; Buckling, Angus; Adaptation to public goods cheats in Pseudomonas aeruginosa; The Royal Society; Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences; 284; 1859; 7-2017; 1-8
0962-8452
1471-2954
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/lookup/doi/10.1098/rspb.2017.1089
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1098/rspb.2017.1089
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv The Royal Society
publisher.none.fl_str_mv The Royal Society
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
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instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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