New Remarks on the Cosmological Argument

Autores
Romero, Gustavo Esteban; Pérez, Daniela
Año de publicación
2012
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We present a formal analysis of the Cosmological Argument in its two main forms: that due to Aquinas, and the revised version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument more recently advocated by William Lane Craig. We formulate these two arguments in such a way that each conclusion follows in first-order logic from the corresponding assumptions. Our analysis shows that the conclusion which follows for Aquinas is considerably weaker than what his aims demand. With formalizations that are logically valid in hand, we reinterpret the natural language versions of the premises and conclusions in terms of concepts of causality consistent with (and used in) recent work in cosmology done by physicists. In brief: the Kalam argument commits the fallacy of equivocation in a way that seems beyond repair; two of the premises adopted by Aquinas seem dubious when the terms ?cause? and ?causality? are interpreted in the context of contemporary empirical science. Thus, while there are no problems with whether the conclusions follow logically from their assumptions, the Kalam argument is not viable, and the Aquinas argument does not imply a caused origination of the universe. The assumptions of the latter are at best less than obvious relative to recent work in the sciences. We conclude with mention of a new argument that makes some positive modifications to an alternative variation on Aquinas by Le Poidevin, which nonetheless seems rather weak.
Fil: Romero, Gustavo Esteban. Provincia de Buenos Aires. Gobernación. Comision de Investigaciones Científicas. Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomía. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata. Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomia; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de la Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Astronómicas y Geofísicas; Argentina
Fil: Pérez, Daniela. Provincia de Buenos Aires. Gobernación. Comision de Investigaciones Científicas. Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomía. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata. Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomia; Argentina
Materia
Causality
Cosmology
Theology
Semantics
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/16832
Acceder
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spelling New Remarks on the Cosmological ArgumentRomero, Gustavo EstebanPérez, DanielaCausalityCosmologyTheologySemanticshttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1We present a formal analysis of the Cosmological Argument in its two main forms: that due to Aquinas, and the revised version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument more recently advocated by William Lane Craig. We formulate these two arguments in such a way that each conclusion follows in first-order logic from the corresponding assumptions. Our analysis shows that the conclusion which follows for Aquinas is considerably weaker than what his aims demand. With formalizations that are logically valid in hand, we reinterpret the natural language versions of the premises and conclusions in terms of concepts of causality consistent with (and used in) recent work in cosmology done by physicists. In brief: the Kalam argument commits the fallacy of equivocation in a way that seems beyond repair; two of the premises adopted by Aquinas seem dubious when the terms ?cause? and ?causality? are interpreted in the context of contemporary empirical science. Thus, while there are no problems with whether the conclusions follow logically from their assumptions, the Kalam argument is not viable, and the Aquinas argument does not imply a caused origination of the universe. The assumptions of the latter are at best less than obvious relative to recent work in the sciences. We conclude with mention of a new argument that makes some positive modifications to an alternative variation on Aquinas by Le Poidevin, which nonetheless seems rather weak.Fil: Romero, Gustavo Esteban. Provincia de Buenos Aires. Gobernación. Comision de Investigaciones Científicas. Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomía. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata. Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomia; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de la Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Astronómicas y Geofísicas; ArgentinaFil: Pérez, Daniela. Provincia de Buenos Aires. Gobernación. Comision de Investigaciones Científicas. Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomía. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata. Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomia; ArgentinaSpringer2012-02info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/16832Romero, Gustavo Esteban; Pérez, Daniela; New Remarks on the Cosmological Argument; Springer; International Journal for Philosophy of Religion; 72; 2; 2-2012; 103-1130020-7047enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11153-012-9337-6info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11153-012-9337-6info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:53:23Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/16832instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:53:23.493CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv New Remarks on the Cosmological Argument
title New Remarks on the Cosmological Argument
spellingShingle New Remarks on the Cosmological Argument
Romero, Gustavo Esteban
Causality
Cosmology
Theology
Semantics
title_short New Remarks on the Cosmological Argument
title_full New Remarks on the Cosmological Argument
title_fullStr New Remarks on the Cosmological Argument
title_full_unstemmed New Remarks on the Cosmological Argument
title_sort New Remarks on the Cosmological Argument
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Romero, Gustavo Esteban
Pérez, Daniela
author Romero, Gustavo Esteban
author_facet Romero, Gustavo Esteban
Pérez, Daniela
author_role author
author2 Pérez, Daniela
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Causality
Cosmology
Theology
Semantics
topic Causality
Cosmology
Theology
Semantics
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We present a formal analysis of the Cosmological Argument in its two main forms: that due to Aquinas, and the revised version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument more recently advocated by William Lane Craig. We formulate these two arguments in such a way that each conclusion follows in first-order logic from the corresponding assumptions. Our analysis shows that the conclusion which follows for Aquinas is considerably weaker than what his aims demand. With formalizations that are logically valid in hand, we reinterpret the natural language versions of the premises and conclusions in terms of concepts of causality consistent with (and used in) recent work in cosmology done by physicists. In brief: the Kalam argument commits the fallacy of equivocation in a way that seems beyond repair; two of the premises adopted by Aquinas seem dubious when the terms ?cause? and ?causality? are interpreted in the context of contemporary empirical science. Thus, while there are no problems with whether the conclusions follow logically from their assumptions, the Kalam argument is not viable, and the Aquinas argument does not imply a caused origination of the universe. The assumptions of the latter are at best less than obvious relative to recent work in the sciences. We conclude with mention of a new argument that makes some positive modifications to an alternative variation on Aquinas by Le Poidevin, which nonetheless seems rather weak.
Fil: Romero, Gustavo Esteban. Provincia de Buenos Aires. Gobernación. Comision de Investigaciones Científicas. Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomía. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata. Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomia; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de la Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Astronómicas y Geofísicas; Argentina
Fil: Pérez, Daniela. Provincia de Buenos Aires. Gobernación. Comision de Investigaciones Científicas. Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomía. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata. Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomia; Argentina
description We present a formal analysis of the Cosmological Argument in its two main forms: that due to Aquinas, and the revised version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument more recently advocated by William Lane Craig. We formulate these two arguments in such a way that each conclusion follows in first-order logic from the corresponding assumptions. Our analysis shows that the conclusion which follows for Aquinas is considerably weaker than what his aims demand. With formalizations that are logically valid in hand, we reinterpret the natural language versions of the premises and conclusions in terms of concepts of causality consistent with (and used in) recent work in cosmology done by physicists. In brief: the Kalam argument commits the fallacy of equivocation in a way that seems beyond repair; two of the premises adopted by Aquinas seem dubious when the terms ?cause? and ?causality? are interpreted in the context of contemporary empirical science. Thus, while there are no problems with whether the conclusions follow logically from their assumptions, the Kalam argument is not viable, and the Aquinas argument does not imply a caused origination of the universe. The assumptions of the latter are at best less than obvious relative to recent work in the sciences. We conclude with mention of a new argument that makes some positive modifications to an alternative variation on Aquinas by Le Poidevin, which nonetheless seems rather weak.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012-02
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/16832
Romero, Gustavo Esteban; Pérez, Daniela; New Remarks on the Cosmological Argument; Springer; International Journal for Philosophy of Religion; 72; 2; 2-2012; 103-113
0020-7047
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/16832
identifier_str_mv Romero, Gustavo Esteban; Pérez, Daniela; New Remarks on the Cosmological Argument; Springer; International Journal for Philosophy of Religion; 72; 2; 2-2012; 103-113
0020-7047
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11153-012-9337-6
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11153-012-9337-6
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.070432

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