Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes

Autores
Bonvecchi, Alejandro; Simison, Emilia
Año de publicación
2017
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
The literature on authoritarian regimes assumes legislatures are inconsequential because dictators ultimately retain their hold on power. We challenge this assumption arguing that legislatures embedded in power-sharing arrangements are costly to ignore, their design affects lawmaking patterns, and they are more influential when executives are collective, rather than personal. We test these arguments on a case for which complete records exist: the Legislative Advisory Commission in Argentina?s last military dictatorship. Our findings show that the combination of tripartite power-sharing by the armed forces, a collective executive, shared legislative power, and decentralized agenda power led to higher rates of government legislative defeats and bill amendments than typical in authoritarian regimes. These findings support the theory that legislatures under authoritarianism are more influential when power-sharing arrangements include collective executives.
Fil: Bonvecchi, Alejandro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina
Fil: Simison, Emilia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones "Gino Germani"; Argentina
Materia
Authoritarian Regimes
Legislatures
Proceso
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5 AR)
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/76721

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spelling Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian RegimesBonvecchi, AlejandroSimison, EmiliaAuthoritarian RegimesLegislaturesProcesohttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.4https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5The literature on authoritarian regimes assumes legislatures are inconsequential because dictators ultimately retain their hold on power. We challenge this assumption arguing that legislatures embedded in power-sharing arrangements are costly to ignore, their design affects lawmaking patterns, and they are more influential when executives are collective, rather than personal. We test these arguments on a case for which complete records exist: the Legislative Advisory Commission in Argentina?s last military dictatorship. Our findings show that the combination of tripartite power-sharing by the armed forces, a collective executive, shared legislative power, and decentralized agenda power led to higher rates of government legislative defeats and bill amendments than typical in authoritarian regimes. These findings support the theory that legislatures under authoritarianism are more influential when power-sharing arrangements include collective executives.Fil: Bonvecchi, Alejandro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; ArgentinaFil: Simison, Emilia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones "Gino Germani"; ArgentinaCity University of New York2017-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/76721Bonvecchi, Alejandro; Simison, Emilia; Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes; City University of New York; Comparative Politics; 49; 4; 7-2017; 521-5390010-4159CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/2017/00000049/00000004/art00006info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5 AR)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:48:02Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/76721instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:48:03.092CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes
title Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes
spellingShingle Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes
Bonvecchi, Alejandro
Authoritarian Regimes
Legislatures
Proceso
title_short Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes
title_full Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes
title_fullStr Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes
title_full_unstemmed Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes
title_sort Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Bonvecchi, Alejandro
Simison, Emilia
author Bonvecchi, Alejandro
author_facet Bonvecchi, Alejandro
Simison, Emilia
author_role author
author2 Simison, Emilia
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Authoritarian Regimes
Legislatures
Proceso
topic Authoritarian Regimes
Legislatures
Proceso
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.4
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The literature on authoritarian regimes assumes legislatures are inconsequential because dictators ultimately retain their hold on power. We challenge this assumption arguing that legislatures embedded in power-sharing arrangements are costly to ignore, their design affects lawmaking patterns, and they are more influential when executives are collective, rather than personal. We test these arguments on a case for which complete records exist: the Legislative Advisory Commission in Argentina?s last military dictatorship. Our findings show that the combination of tripartite power-sharing by the armed forces, a collective executive, shared legislative power, and decentralized agenda power led to higher rates of government legislative defeats and bill amendments than typical in authoritarian regimes. These findings support the theory that legislatures under authoritarianism are more influential when power-sharing arrangements include collective executives.
Fil: Bonvecchi, Alejandro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina
Fil: Simison, Emilia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones "Gino Germani"; Argentina
description The literature on authoritarian regimes assumes legislatures are inconsequential because dictators ultimately retain their hold on power. We challenge this assumption arguing that legislatures embedded in power-sharing arrangements are costly to ignore, their design affects lawmaking patterns, and they are more influential when executives are collective, rather than personal. We test these arguments on a case for which complete records exist: the Legislative Advisory Commission in Argentina?s last military dictatorship. Our findings show that the combination of tripartite power-sharing by the armed forces, a collective executive, shared legislative power, and decentralized agenda power led to higher rates of government legislative defeats and bill amendments than typical in authoritarian regimes. These findings support the theory that legislatures under authoritarianism are more influential when power-sharing arrangements include collective executives.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-07
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/76721
Bonvecchi, Alejandro; Simison, Emilia; Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes; City University of New York; Comparative Politics; 49; 4; 7-2017; 521-539
0010-4159
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/76721
identifier_str_mv Bonvecchi, Alejandro; Simison, Emilia; Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes; City University of New York; Comparative Politics; 49; 4; 7-2017; 521-539
0010-4159
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/2017/00000049/00000004/art00006
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5 AR)
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5 AR)
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv City University of New York
publisher.none.fl_str_mv City University of New York
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.070432