Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes
- Autores
- Bonvecchi, Alejandro; Simison, Emilia
- Año de publicación
- 2017
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- The literature on authoritarian regimes assumes legislatures are inconsequential because dictators ultimately retain their hold on power. We challenge this assumption arguing that legislatures embedded in power-sharing arrangements are costly to ignore, their design affects lawmaking patterns, and they are more influential when executives are collective, rather than personal. We test these arguments on a case for which complete records exist: the Legislative Advisory Commission in Argentina?s last military dictatorship. Our findings show that the combination of tripartite power-sharing by the armed forces, a collective executive, shared legislative power, and decentralized agenda power led to higher rates of government legislative defeats and bill amendments than typical in authoritarian regimes. These findings support the theory that legislatures under authoritarianism are more influential when power-sharing arrangements include collective executives.
Fil: Bonvecchi, Alejandro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina
Fil: Simison, Emilia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones "Gino Germani"; Argentina - Materia
-
Authoritarian Regimes
Legislatures
Proceso - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5 AR)
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/76721
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Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian RegimesBonvecchi, AlejandroSimison, EmiliaAuthoritarian RegimesLegislaturesProcesohttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.4https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5The literature on authoritarian regimes assumes legislatures are inconsequential because dictators ultimately retain their hold on power. We challenge this assumption arguing that legislatures embedded in power-sharing arrangements are costly to ignore, their design affects lawmaking patterns, and they are more influential when executives are collective, rather than personal. We test these arguments on a case for which complete records exist: the Legislative Advisory Commission in Argentina?s last military dictatorship. Our findings show that the combination of tripartite power-sharing by the armed forces, a collective executive, shared legislative power, and decentralized agenda power led to higher rates of government legislative defeats and bill amendments than typical in authoritarian regimes. These findings support the theory that legislatures under authoritarianism are more influential when power-sharing arrangements include collective executives.Fil: Bonvecchi, Alejandro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; ArgentinaFil: Simison, Emilia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones "Gino Germani"; ArgentinaCity University of New York2017-07info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/76721Bonvecchi, Alejandro; Simison, Emilia; Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes; City University of New York; Comparative Politics; 49; 4; 7-2017; 521-5390010-4159CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/2017/00000049/00000004/art00006info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5 AR)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:48:02Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/76721instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:48:03.092CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes |
title |
Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes |
spellingShingle |
Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes Bonvecchi, Alejandro Authoritarian Regimes Legislatures Proceso |
title_short |
Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes |
title_full |
Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes |
title_fullStr |
Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes |
title_full_unstemmed |
Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes |
title_sort |
Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Bonvecchi, Alejandro Simison, Emilia |
author |
Bonvecchi, Alejandro |
author_facet |
Bonvecchi, Alejandro Simison, Emilia |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Simison, Emilia |
author2_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Authoritarian Regimes Legislatures Proceso |
topic |
Authoritarian Regimes Legislatures Proceso |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.4 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
The literature on authoritarian regimes assumes legislatures are inconsequential because dictators ultimately retain their hold on power. We challenge this assumption arguing that legislatures embedded in power-sharing arrangements are costly to ignore, their design affects lawmaking patterns, and they are more influential when executives are collective, rather than personal. We test these arguments on a case for which complete records exist: the Legislative Advisory Commission in Argentina?s last military dictatorship. Our findings show that the combination of tripartite power-sharing by the armed forces, a collective executive, shared legislative power, and decentralized agenda power led to higher rates of government legislative defeats and bill amendments than typical in authoritarian regimes. These findings support the theory that legislatures under authoritarianism are more influential when power-sharing arrangements include collective executives. Fil: Bonvecchi, Alejandro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina Fil: Simison, Emilia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones "Gino Germani"; Argentina |
description |
The literature on authoritarian regimes assumes legislatures are inconsequential because dictators ultimately retain their hold on power. We challenge this assumption arguing that legislatures embedded in power-sharing arrangements are costly to ignore, their design affects lawmaking patterns, and they are more influential when executives are collective, rather than personal. We test these arguments on a case for which complete records exist: the Legislative Advisory Commission in Argentina?s last military dictatorship. Our findings show that the combination of tripartite power-sharing by the armed forces, a collective executive, shared legislative power, and decentralized agenda power led to higher rates of government legislative defeats and bill amendments than typical in authoritarian regimes. These findings support the theory that legislatures under authoritarianism are more influential when power-sharing arrangements include collective executives. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-07 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/76721 Bonvecchi, Alejandro; Simison, Emilia; Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes; City University of New York; Comparative Politics; 49; 4; 7-2017; 521-539 0010-4159 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/76721 |
identifier_str_mv |
Bonvecchi, Alejandro; Simison, Emilia; Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes; City University of New York; Comparative Politics; 49; 4; 7-2017; 521-539 0010-4159 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/2017/00000049/00000004/art00006 |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5 AR) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
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Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 2.5 Argentina (CC BY-NC-SA 2.5 AR) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
City University of New York |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
City University of New York |
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Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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