Referential inconstancy in natural language

Autores
García Ramírez, Eduardo
Año de publicación
2024
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
There is a lively debate between proponents of referentialist and predicativist semantics about the nature of proper names in natural language. Still, the assumption that bare singular (referential) uses of proper names in argument position of a predicate are modally constant —they have one and the same referent across modal scenarios— has become orthodoxy in the field. This is a mistake, as there are referential yet inconstant uses of proper names in argument position. Initially presented in a rather ignored passage of Lewis’ (1986) seminal work on modality [Lewis, 1986:248–253] these data create a puzzle for extant theories of proper names. Referential uses in argument position are typically assumed to be constant. However, they can be turned inconstant depending on context. As a result, constancy may not be accounted for in virtue of semantics, and neither may inconstancy. Current theories of proper names must address this and account for referential constancy and inconstancy, but they cannot do so in semantic terms. The paper begins, section 1, with a brief account of the dispute between referentialist and predicativist theories of proper names, showing how both traditions are committed to referential constancy. Section 2 presents Lewis’ (1986) data on referential inconstancy and why it is problematic. Section 3 shows how this result may be generalized for any ordinary proper name. Section 4 considers three possible objections and why they fail. The paper concludes, section 5, by considering Kripke’s (1980) take on referential constancy as the result of stipulation and independent from semantics, suggesting a syntactic approach to referential uses of proper names.
Fil: García Ramírez, Eduardo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina
Materia
PROPER NAMES
MODAL CONSTANCY
SEMANTICS
REFERENCE
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/260788

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spelling Referential inconstancy in natural languageGarcía Ramírez, EduardoPROPER NAMESMODAL CONSTANCYSEMANTICSREFERENCEhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6There is a lively debate between proponents of referentialist and predicativist semantics about the nature of proper names in natural language. Still, the assumption that bare singular (referential) uses of proper names in argument position of a predicate are modally constant —they have one and the same referent across modal scenarios— has become orthodoxy in the field. This is a mistake, as there are referential yet inconstant uses of proper names in argument position. Initially presented in a rather ignored passage of Lewis’ (1986) seminal work on modality [Lewis, 1986:248–253] these data create a puzzle for extant theories of proper names. Referential uses in argument position are typically assumed to be constant. However, they can be turned inconstant depending on context. As a result, constancy may not be accounted for in virtue of semantics, and neither may inconstancy. Current theories of proper names must address this and account for referential constancy and inconstancy, but they cannot do so in semantic terms. The paper begins, section 1, with a brief account of the dispute between referentialist and predicativist theories of proper names, showing how both traditions are committed to referential constancy. Section 2 presents Lewis’ (1986) data on referential inconstancy and why it is problematic. Section 3 shows how this result may be generalized for any ordinary proper name. Section 4 considers three possible objections and why they fail. The paper concludes, section 5, by considering Kripke’s (1980) take on referential constancy as the result of stipulation and independent from semantics, suggesting a syntactic approach to referential uses of proper names.Fil: García Ramírez, Eduardo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; ArgentinaUbiquity Press2024-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/260788García Ramírez, Eduardo; Referential inconstancy in natural language; Ubiquity Press; Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics; 9; 1; 9-2024; 1-232397-1835CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.glossa-journal.org/article/id/10851/info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.16995/glossa.10851info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:28:43Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/260788instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:28:43.873CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Referential inconstancy in natural language
title Referential inconstancy in natural language
spellingShingle Referential inconstancy in natural language
García Ramírez, Eduardo
PROPER NAMES
MODAL CONSTANCY
SEMANTICS
REFERENCE
title_short Referential inconstancy in natural language
title_full Referential inconstancy in natural language
title_fullStr Referential inconstancy in natural language
title_full_unstemmed Referential inconstancy in natural language
title_sort Referential inconstancy in natural language
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv García Ramírez, Eduardo
author García Ramírez, Eduardo
author_facet García Ramírez, Eduardo
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv PROPER NAMES
MODAL CONSTANCY
SEMANTICS
REFERENCE
topic PROPER NAMES
MODAL CONSTANCY
SEMANTICS
REFERENCE
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv There is a lively debate between proponents of referentialist and predicativist semantics about the nature of proper names in natural language. Still, the assumption that bare singular (referential) uses of proper names in argument position of a predicate are modally constant —they have one and the same referent across modal scenarios— has become orthodoxy in the field. This is a mistake, as there are referential yet inconstant uses of proper names in argument position. Initially presented in a rather ignored passage of Lewis’ (1986) seminal work on modality [Lewis, 1986:248–253] these data create a puzzle for extant theories of proper names. Referential uses in argument position are typically assumed to be constant. However, they can be turned inconstant depending on context. As a result, constancy may not be accounted for in virtue of semantics, and neither may inconstancy. Current theories of proper names must address this and account for referential constancy and inconstancy, but they cannot do so in semantic terms. The paper begins, section 1, with a brief account of the dispute between referentialist and predicativist theories of proper names, showing how both traditions are committed to referential constancy. Section 2 presents Lewis’ (1986) data on referential inconstancy and why it is problematic. Section 3 shows how this result may be generalized for any ordinary proper name. Section 4 considers three possible objections and why they fail. The paper concludes, section 5, by considering Kripke’s (1980) take on referential constancy as the result of stipulation and independent from semantics, suggesting a syntactic approach to referential uses of proper names.
Fil: García Ramírez, Eduardo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina
description There is a lively debate between proponents of referentialist and predicativist semantics about the nature of proper names in natural language. Still, the assumption that bare singular (referential) uses of proper names in argument position of a predicate are modally constant —they have one and the same referent across modal scenarios— has become orthodoxy in the field. This is a mistake, as there are referential yet inconstant uses of proper names in argument position. Initially presented in a rather ignored passage of Lewis’ (1986) seminal work on modality [Lewis, 1986:248–253] these data create a puzzle for extant theories of proper names. Referential uses in argument position are typically assumed to be constant. However, they can be turned inconstant depending on context. As a result, constancy may not be accounted for in virtue of semantics, and neither may inconstancy. Current theories of proper names must address this and account for referential constancy and inconstancy, but they cannot do so in semantic terms. The paper begins, section 1, with a brief account of the dispute between referentialist and predicativist theories of proper names, showing how both traditions are committed to referential constancy. Section 2 presents Lewis’ (1986) data on referential inconstancy and why it is problematic. Section 3 shows how this result may be generalized for any ordinary proper name. Section 4 considers three possible objections and why they fail. The paper concludes, section 5, by considering Kripke’s (1980) take on referential constancy as the result of stipulation and independent from semantics, suggesting a syntactic approach to referential uses of proper names.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2024-09
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/260788
García Ramírez, Eduardo; Referential inconstancy in natural language; Ubiquity Press; Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics; 9; 1; 9-2024; 1-23
2397-1835
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/260788
identifier_str_mv García Ramírez, Eduardo; Referential inconstancy in natural language; Ubiquity Press; Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics; 9; 1; 9-2024; 1-23
2397-1835
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.glossa-journal.org/article/id/10851/
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.16995/glossa.10851
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Ubiquity Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Ubiquity Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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