Referential inconstancy in natural language
- Autores
- García Ramírez, Eduardo
- Año de publicación
- 2024
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- There is a lively debate between proponents of referentialist and predicativist semantics about the nature of proper names in natural language. Still, the assumption that bare singular (referential) uses of proper names in argument position of a predicate are modally constant —they have one and the same referent across modal scenarios— has become orthodoxy in the field. This is a mistake, as there are referential yet inconstant uses of proper names in argument position. Initially presented in a rather ignored passage of Lewis’ (1986) seminal work on modality [Lewis, 1986:248–253] these data create a puzzle for extant theories of proper names. Referential uses in argument position are typically assumed to be constant. However, they can be turned inconstant depending on context. As a result, constancy may not be accounted for in virtue of semantics, and neither may inconstancy. Current theories of proper names must address this and account for referential constancy and inconstancy, but they cannot do so in semantic terms. The paper begins, section 1, with a brief account of the dispute between referentialist and predicativist theories of proper names, showing how both traditions are committed to referential constancy. Section 2 presents Lewis’ (1986) data on referential inconstancy and why it is problematic. Section 3 shows how this result may be generalized for any ordinary proper name. Section 4 considers three possible objections and why they fail. The paper concludes, section 5, by considering Kripke’s (1980) take on referential constancy as the result of stipulation and independent from semantics, suggesting a syntactic approach to referential uses of proper names.
Fil: García Ramírez, Eduardo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina - Materia
-
PROPER NAMES
MODAL CONSTANCY
SEMANTICS
REFERENCE - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/260788
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
id |
CONICETDig_b2e33f67cc3b246876b49f36f6a9512f |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/260788 |
network_acronym_str |
CONICETDig |
repository_id_str |
3498 |
network_name_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
spelling |
Referential inconstancy in natural languageGarcía Ramírez, EduardoPROPER NAMESMODAL CONSTANCYSEMANTICSREFERENCEhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6There is a lively debate between proponents of referentialist and predicativist semantics about the nature of proper names in natural language. Still, the assumption that bare singular (referential) uses of proper names in argument position of a predicate are modally constant —they have one and the same referent across modal scenarios— has become orthodoxy in the field. This is a mistake, as there are referential yet inconstant uses of proper names in argument position. Initially presented in a rather ignored passage of Lewis’ (1986) seminal work on modality [Lewis, 1986:248–253] these data create a puzzle for extant theories of proper names. Referential uses in argument position are typically assumed to be constant. However, they can be turned inconstant depending on context. As a result, constancy may not be accounted for in virtue of semantics, and neither may inconstancy. Current theories of proper names must address this and account for referential constancy and inconstancy, but they cannot do so in semantic terms. The paper begins, section 1, with a brief account of the dispute between referentialist and predicativist theories of proper names, showing how both traditions are committed to referential constancy. Section 2 presents Lewis’ (1986) data on referential inconstancy and why it is problematic. Section 3 shows how this result may be generalized for any ordinary proper name. Section 4 considers three possible objections and why they fail. The paper concludes, section 5, by considering Kripke’s (1980) take on referential constancy as the result of stipulation and independent from semantics, suggesting a syntactic approach to referential uses of proper names.Fil: García Ramírez, Eduardo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; ArgentinaUbiquity Press2024-09info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/260788García Ramírez, Eduardo; Referential inconstancy in natural language; Ubiquity Press; Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics; 9; 1; 9-2024; 1-232397-1835CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.glossa-journal.org/article/id/10851/info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.16995/glossa.10851info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:28:43Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/260788instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:28:43.873CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Referential inconstancy in natural language |
title |
Referential inconstancy in natural language |
spellingShingle |
Referential inconstancy in natural language García Ramírez, Eduardo PROPER NAMES MODAL CONSTANCY SEMANTICS REFERENCE |
title_short |
Referential inconstancy in natural language |
title_full |
Referential inconstancy in natural language |
title_fullStr |
Referential inconstancy in natural language |
title_full_unstemmed |
Referential inconstancy in natural language |
title_sort |
Referential inconstancy in natural language |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
García Ramírez, Eduardo |
author |
García Ramírez, Eduardo |
author_facet |
García Ramírez, Eduardo |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
PROPER NAMES MODAL CONSTANCY SEMANTICS REFERENCE |
topic |
PROPER NAMES MODAL CONSTANCY SEMANTICS REFERENCE |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
There is a lively debate between proponents of referentialist and predicativist semantics about the nature of proper names in natural language. Still, the assumption that bare singular (referential) uses of proper names in argument position of a predicate are modally constant —they have one and the same referent across modal scenarios— has become orthodoxy in the field. This is a mistake, as there are referential yet inconstant uses of proper names in argument position. Initially presented in a rather ignored passage of Lewis’ (1986) seminal work on modality [Lewis, 1986:248–253] these data create a puzzle for extant theories of proper names. Referential uses in argument position are typically assumed to be constant. However, they can be turned inconstant depending on context. As a result, constancy may not be accounted for in virtue of semantics, and neither may inconstancy. Current theories of proper names must address this and account for referential constancy and inconstancy, but they cannot do so in semantic terms. The paper begins, section 1, with a brief account of the dispute between referentialist and predicativist theories of proper names, showing how both traditions are committed to referential constancy. Section 2 presents Lewis’ (1986) data on referential inconstancy and why it is problematic. Section 3 shows how this result may be generalized for any ordinary proper name. Section 4 considers three possible objections and why they fail. The paper concludes, section 5, by considering Kripke’s (1980) take on referential constancy as the result of stipulation and independent from semantics, suggesting a syntactic approach to referential uses of proper names. Fil: García Ramírez, Eduardo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina |
description |
There is a lively debate between proponents of referentialist and predicativist semantics about the nature of proper names in natural language. Still, the assumption that bare singular (referential) uses of proper names in argument position of a predicate are modally constant —they have one and the same referent across modal scenarios— has become orthodoxy in the field. This is a mistake, as there are referential yet inconstant uses of proper names in argument position. Initially presented in a rather ignored passage of Lewis’ (1986) seminal work on modality [Lewis, 1986:248–253] these data create a puzzle for extant theories of proper names. Referential uses in argument position are typically assumed to be constant. However, they can be turned inconstant depending on context. As a result, constancy may not be accounted for in virtue of semantics, and neither may inconstancy. Current theories of proper names must address this and account for referential constancy and inconstancy, but they cannot do so in semantic terms. The paper begins, section 1, with a brief account of the dispute between referentialist and predicativist theories of proper names, showing how both traditions are committed to referential constancy. Section 2 presents Lewis’ (1986) data on referential inconstancy and why it is problematic. Section 3 shows how this result may be generalized for any ordinary proper name. Section 4 considers three possible objections and why they fail. The paper concludes, section 5, by considering Kripke’s (1980) take on referential constancy as the result of stipulation and independent from semantics, suggesting a syntactic approach to referential uses of proper names. |
publishDate |
2024 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2024-09 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/260788 García Ramírez, Eduardo; Referential inconstancy in natural language; Ubiquity Press; Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics; 9; 1; 9-2024; 1-23 2397-1835 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/260788 |
identifier_str_mv |
García Ramírez, Eduardo; Referential inconstancy in natural language; Ubiquity Press; Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics; 9; 1; 9-2024; 1-23 2397-1835 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.glossa-journal.org/article/id/10851/ info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.16995/glossa.10851 |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar/ |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Ubiquity Press |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Ubiquity Press |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
reponame_str |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
collection |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
instname_str |
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
_version_ |
1844614291492175872 |
score |
13.070432 |