Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception

Autores
Babino, Andrés; Makse, Hernán Alejandro; Acosta Martínez, Delvis Rafael; Sigman, Mariano
Año de publicación
2018
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
The coexistence of cooperation and selfish instincts is a remarkable characteristic of humans. Psychological research has unveiled the cognitive mechanisms behind self-deception. Two important findings are that a higher ambiguity about others’ social preferences leads to a higher likelihood of acting selfishly and that agents acting selfishly will increase their belief that others are also selfish. In this work, we posit a mathematical model of these mechanisms and explain their impact on the undermining of a global cooperative society. We simulate the behavior of agents playing a prisoner’s dilemma game in a random network of contacts. We endow each agent with these two self-deception mechanisms which bias her toward thinking that the other agent will defect. We study behavior when a fraction of agents with the “always defect” strategy is introduced in the network. Depending on the magnitude of the biases the players could start a cascade of defection or isolate the defectors. We find that there are thresholds above which the system approaches a state of complete distrust.
Fil: Babino, Andrés. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Departamento de Física; Argentina
Fil: Makse, Hernán Alejandro. City College of New York. Levich Institute; Estados Unidos
Fil: Acosta Martínez, Delvis Rafael. Harvard University; Estados Unidos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Canadian Institute for Advanced Research; Canadá
Fil: Sigman, Mariano. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
COOPERATION
CORRUPTION
SELF-DECEPTION
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/98980
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deceptionBabino, AndrésMakse, Hernán AlejandroAcosta Martínez, Delvis RafaelSigman, MarianoBEHAVIORAL ECONOMICSCOGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCECOOPERATIONCORRUPTIONSELF-DECEPTIONhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.7https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1The coexistence of cooperation and selfish instincts is a remarkable characteristic of humans. Psychological research has unveiled the cognitive mechanisms behind self-deception. Two important findings are that a higher ambiguity about others’ social preferences leads to a higher likelihood of acting selfishly and that agents acting selfishly will increase their belief that others are also selfish. In this work, we posit a mathematical model of these mechanisms and explain their impact on the undermining of a global cooperative society. We simulate the behavior of agents playing a prisoner’s dilemma game in a random network of contacts. We endow each agent with these two self-deception mechanisms which bias her toward thinking that the other agent will defect. We study behavior when a fraction of agents with the “always defect” strategy is introduced in the network. Depending on the magnitude of the biases the players could start a cascade of defection or isolate the defectors. We find that there are thresholds above which the system approaches a state of complete distrust.Fil: Babino, Andrés. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Departamento de Física; ArgentinaFil: Makse, Hernán Alejandro. City College of New York. Levich Institute; Estados UnidosFil: Acosta Martínez, Delvis Rafael. Harvard University; Estados Unidos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Canadian Institute for Advanced Research; CanadáFil: Sigman, Mariano. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaNational Academy of Sciences2018-08info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/98980Babino, Andrés; Makse, Hernán Alejandro; Acosta Martínez, Delvis Rafael; Sigman, Mariano; Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception; National Academy of Sciences; Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of The United States of America; 115; 35; 8-2018; 8728-87330027-8424CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.pnas.org/lookup/doi/10.1073/pnas.1803438115info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1073/pnas.1803438115info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-10T12:59:49Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/98980instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-10 12:59:49.247CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception
title Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception
spellingShingle Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception
Babino, Andrés
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
COOPERATION
CORRUPTION
SELF-DECEPTION
title_short Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception
title_full Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception
title_fullStr Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception
title_full_unstemmed Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception
title_sort Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Babino, Andrés
Makse, Hernán Alejandro
Acosta Martínez, Delvis Rafael
Sigman, Mariano
author Babino, Andrés
author_facet Babino, Andrés
Makse, Hernán Alejandro
Acosta Martínez, Delvis Rafael
Sigman, Mariano
author_role author
author2 Makse, Hernán Alejandro
Acosta Martínez, Delvis Rafael
Sigman, Mariano
author2_role author
author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
COOPERATION
CORRUPTION
SELF-DECEPTION
topic BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
COOPERATION
CORRUPTION
SELF-DECEPTION
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.7
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The coexistence of cooperation and selfish instincts is a remarkable characteristic of humans. Psychological research has unveiled the cognitive mechanisms behind self-deception. Two important findings are that a higher ambiguity about others’ social preferences leads to a higher likelihood of acting selfishly and that agents acting selfishly will increase their belief that others are also selfish. In this work, we posit a mathematical model of these mechanisms and explain their impact on the undermining of a global cooperative society. We simulate the behavior of agents playing a prisoner’s dilemma game in a random network of contacts. We endow each agent with these two self-deception mechanisms which bias her toward thinking that the other agent will defect. We study behavior when a fraction of agents with the “always defect” strategy is introduced in the network. Depending on the magnitude of the biases the players could start a cascade of defection or isolate the defectors. We find that there are thresholds above which the system approaches a state of complete distrust.
Fil: Babino, Andrés. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Departamento de Física; Argentina
Fil: Makse, Hernán Alejandro. City College of New York. Levich Institute; Estados Unidos
Fil: Acosta Martínez, Delvis Rafael. Harvard University; Estados Unidos. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Canadian Institute for Advanced Research; Canadá
Fil: Sigman, Mariano. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description The coexistence of cooperation and selfish instincts is a remarkable characteristic of humans. Psychological research has unveiled the cognitive mechanisms behind self-deception. Two important findings are that a higher ambiguity about others’ social preferences leads to a higher likelihood of acting selfishly and that agents acting selfishly will increase their belief that others are also selfish. In this work, we posit a mathematical model of these mechanisms and explain their impact on the undermining of a global cooperative society. We simulate the behavior of agents playing a prisoner’s dilemma game in a random network of contacts. We endow each agent with these two self-deception mechanisms which bias her toward thinking that the other agent will defect. We study behavior when a fraction of agents with the “always defect” strategy is introduced in the network. Depending on the magnitude of the biases the players could start a cascade of defection or isolate the defectors. We find that there are thresholds above which the system approaches a state of complete distrust.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-08
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/98980
Babino, Andrés; Makse, Hernán Alejandro; Acosta Martínez, Delvis Rafael; Sigman, Mariano; Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception; National Academy of Sciences; Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of The United States of America; 115; 35; 8-2018; 8728-8733
0027-8424
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/98980
identifier_str_mv Babino, Andrés; Makse, Hernán Alejandro; Acosta Martínez, Delvis Rafael; Sigman, Mariano; Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception; National Academy of Sciences; Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of The United States of America; 115; 35; 8-2018; 8728-8733
0027-8424
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.pnas.org/lookup/doi/10.1073/pnas.1803438115
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1073/pnas.1803438115
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv National Academy of Sciences
publisher.none.fl_str_mv National Academy of Sciences
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 12.48226

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