Inflation targeting, disinflation, and debt traps in Argentina

Autores
Libman, Emiliano; Palazzo, Gabriel Martín
Año de publicación
2020
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
This paper highlights the role of external indebtedness and the presence of inflationary inertia in order to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of inflation targeting during disinflation episodes. As the recent Argentinian experience illustrates, a sluggish inflation rate and a significant currentaccount deficit may make the stabilization process difficult. To illustrate the point, we build a model that shows that, when inflation adjusts fast, the target may be achieved without building too much external debt. But if inflation adjusts slowly, an excessive build-up of external debt could lead to an increase in the risk premium, a sudden shortage of foreign exchange, and the eventual collapse of the inflation-targeting regime.
Fil: Libman, Emiliano. Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Palazzo, Gabriel Martín. Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
CHRONIC INFLATION
DEBT TRAPS
INFLATION TARGETING
LACK OF CREDIBILITY
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/124610
Acceder
id CONICETDig_87be3327470e4eaf2c4b3bf561b97a17
oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/124610
network_acronym_str CONICETDig
repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Inflation targeting, disinflation, and debt traps in ArgentinaLibman, EmilianoPalazzo, Gabriel MartínCHRONIC INFLATIONDEBT TRAPSINFLATION TARGETINGLACK OF CREDIBILITYhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5This paper highlights the role of external indebtedness and the presence of inflationary inertia in order to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of inflation targeting during disinflation episodes. As the recent Argentinian experience illustrates, a sluggish inflation rate and a significant currentaccount deficit may make the stabilization process difficult. To illustrate the point, we build a model that shows that, when inflation adjusts fast, the target may be achieved without building too much external debt. But if inflation adjusts slowly, an excessive build-up of external debt could lead to an increase in the risk premium, a sudden shortage of foreign exchange, and the eventual collapse of the inflation-targeting regime.Fil: Libman, Emiliano. Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Palazzo, Gabriel Martín. Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaEdward Elgar Publishing Ltd.2020-04info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/124610Libman, Emiliano; Palazzo, Gabriel Martín; Inflation targeting, disinflation, and debt traps in Argentina; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.; European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention; 17; 1; 4-2020; 78-1052052-77642052-7772CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.elgaronline.com/view/journals/ejeep/17-1/ejeep.2020.01.06.xmlinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.4337/ejeep.2019.0050info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:56:31Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/124610instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:56:32.102CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Inflation targeting, disinflation, and debt traps in Argentina
title Inflation targeting, disinflation, and debt traps in Argentina
spellingShingle Inflation targeting, disinflation, and debt traps in Argentina
Libman, Emiliano
CHRONIC INFLATION
DEBT TRAPS
INFLATION TARGETING
LACK OF CREDIBILITY
title_short Inflation targeting, disinflation, and debt traps in Argentina
title_full Inflation targeting, disinflation, and debt traps in Argentina
title_fullStr Inflation targeting, disinflation, and debt traps in Argentina
title_full_unstemmed Inflation targeting, disinflation, and debt traps in Argentina
title_sort Inflation targeting, disinflation, and debt traps in Argentina
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Libman, Emiliano
Palazzo, Gabriel Martín
author Libman, Emiliano
author_facet Libman, Emiliano
Palazzo, Gabriel Martín
author_role author
author2 Palazzo, Gabriel Martín
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv CHRONIC INFLATION
DEBT TRAPS
INFLATION TARGETING
LACK OF CREDIBILITY
topic CHRONIC INFLATION
DEBT TRAPS
INFLATION TARGETING
LACK OF CREDIBILITY
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv This paper highlights the role of external indebtedness and the presence of inflationary inertia in order to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of inflation targeting during disinflation episodes. As the recent Argentinian experience illustrates, a sluggish inflation rate and a significant currentaccount deficit may make the stabilization process difficult. To illustrate the point, we build a model that shows that, when inflation adjusts fast, the target may be achieved without building too much external debt. But if inflation adjusts slowly, an excessive build-up of external debt could lead to an increase in the risk premium, a sudden shortage of foreign exchange, and the eventual collapse of the inflation-targeting regime.
Fil: Libman, Emiliano. Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Fil: Palazzo, Gabriel Martín. Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description This paper highlights the role of external indebtedness and the presence of inflationary inertia in order to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of inflation targeting during disinflation episodes. As the recent Argentinian experience illustrates, a sluggish inflation rate and a significant currentaccount deficit may make the stabilization process difficult. To illustrate the point, we build a model that shows that, when inflation adjusts fast, the target may be achieved without building too much external debt. But if inflation adjusts slowly, an excessive build-up of external debt could lead to an increase in the risk premium, a sudden shortage of foreign exchange, and the eventual collapse of the inflation-targeting regime.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020-04
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/124610
Libman, Emiliano; Palazzo, Gabriel Martín; Inflation targeting, disinflation, and debt traps in Argentina; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.; European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention; 17; 1; 4-2020; 78-105
2052-7764
2052-7772
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/124610
identifier_str_mv Libman, Emiliano; Palazzo, Gabriel Martín; Inflation targeting, disinflation, and debt traps in Argentina; Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.; European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention; 17; 1; 4-2020; 78-105
2052-7764
2052-7772
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.elgaronline.com/view/journals/ejeep/17-1/ejeep.2020.01.06.xml
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.4337/ejeep.2019.0050
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
_version_ 1842269407550636032
score 13.13397

Publicaciones similares