Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction

Autores
Clerici, Paula Andrea; Demeco, Lucía; Galeano, Franco; Negri Malbran, Juan Javier
Año de publicación
2023
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
conjunto de datos
Estado
Descripción
In federal presidential democracies, discretionary transfers are often mentioned as a tool used by the national executive to build and strengthen subnational support, typically governors. Funds to local mayors, however, have been much less studied. With original data, in this study, we analyze the distribution of a particular discretionary transfer (ATN) to the Argentine municipalities during two periods: 1997-2000 and 2016-2019. We show that the main driver for transfers is the mayor´s political alignment. Indeed, the president is more likely to reward loyal mayors, but especially when both the latter and the President oppose the provincial governor. By this token, we highlight a nested political game, in which the President considers the loyalty of both mayors and governors combined to decide when to reward (or when not to reward) municipalities. Furthermore, we find that the Executive provides aid to smaller municipalities to circumvent the possibility of funding mayors from larger cities who may pose a threat as political rivals in the future. Since this pattern is more evident in localities with aligned mayors, we can infer that the President's strategy is aimed at preventing future challengers from within their own coalition.
Fil: Clerici, Paula Andrea. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Cs.politica y Estudios Internacionales. Prog.de Estudios Electorales y Legislativos; Argentina
Fil: Demeco, Lucía. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina
Fil: Galeano, Franco. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina
Fil: Negri Malbran, Juan Javier. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/209595

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spelling Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political ConstructionClerici, Paula AndreaDemeco, LucíaGaleano, FrancoNegri Malbran, Juan Javierhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5In federal presidential democracies, discretionary transfers are often mentioned as a tool used by the national executive to build and strengthen subnational support, typically governors. Funds to local mayors, however, have been much less studied. With original data, in this study, we analyze the distribution of a particular discretionary transfer (ATN) to the Argentine municipalities during two periods: 1997-2000 and 2016-2019. We show that the main driver for transfers is the mayor´s political alignment. Indeed, the president is more likely to reward loyal mayors, but especially when both the latter and the President oppose the provincial governor. By this token, we highlight a nested political game, in which the President considers the loyalty of both mayors and governors combined to decide when to reward (or when not to reward) municipalities. Furthermore, we find that the Executive provides aid to smaller municipalities to circumvent the possibility of funding mayors from larger cities who may pose a threat as political rivals in the future. Since this pattern is more evident in localities with aligned mayors, we can infer that the President's strategy is aimed at preventing future challengers from within their own coalition.Fil: Clerici, Paula Andrea. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Cs.politica y Estudios Internacionales. Prog.de Estudios Electorales y Legislativos; ArgentinaFil: Demeco, Lucía. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; ArgentinaFil: Galeano, Franco. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; ArgentinaFil: Negri Malbran, Juan Javier. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina2023info:ar-repo/semantics/conjuntoDeDatosv1.0info:eu-repo/semantics/dataSetapplication/octet-streamhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/209595Clerici, Paula Andrea; Demeco, Lucía; Galeano, Franco; Negri Malbran, Juan Javier; (2023): Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. (dataset). http://hdl.handle.net/11336/209595CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2026-01-14T11:54:05Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/209595instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982026-01-14 11:54:05.349CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction
title Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction
spellingShingle Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction
Clerici, Paula Andrea
title_short Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction
title_full Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction
title_fullStr Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction
title_full_unstemmed Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction
title_sort Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Clerici, Paula Andrea
Demeco, Lucía
Galeano, Franco
Negri Malbran, Juan Javier
author Clerici, Paula Andrea
author_facet Clerici, Paula Andrea
Demeco, Lucía
Galeano, Franco
Negri Malbran, Juan Javier
author_role author
author2 Demeco, Lucía
Galeano, Franco
Negri Malbran, Juan Javier
author2_role author
author
author
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv In federal presidential democracies, discretionary transfers are often mentioned as a tool used by the national executive to build and strengthen subnational support, typically governors. Funds to local mayors, however, have been much less studied. With original data, in this study, we analyze the distribution of a particular discretionary transfer (ATN) to the Argentine municipalities during two periods: 1997-2000 and 2016-2019. We show that the main driver for transfers is the mayor´s political alignment. Indeed, the president is more likely to reward loyal mayors, but especially when both the latter and the President oppose the provincial governor. By this token, we highlight a nested political game, in which the President considers the loyalty of both mayors and governors combined to decide when to reward (or when not to reward) municipalities. Furthermore, we find that the Executive provides aid to smaller municipalities to circumvent the possibility of funding mayors from larger cities who may pose a threat as political rivals in the future. Since this pattern is more evident in localities with aligned mayors, we can infer that the President's strategy is aimed at preventing future challengers from within their own coalition.
Fil: Clerici, Paula Andrea. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Cs.politica y Estudios Internacionales. Prog.de Estudios Electorales y Legislativos; Argentina
Fil: Demeco, Lucía. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina
Fil: Galeano, Franco. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina
Fil: Negri Malbran, Juan Javier. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina
description In federal presidential democracies, discretionary transfers are often mentioned as a tool used by the national executive to build and strengthen subnational support, typically governors. Funds to local mayors, however, have been much less studied. With original data, in this study, we analyze the distribution of a particular discretionary transfer (ATN) to the Argentine municipalities during two periods: 1997-2000 and 2016-2019. We show that the main driver for transfers is the mayor´s political alignment. Indeed, the president is more likely to reward loyal mayors, but especially when both the latter and the President oppose the provincial governor. By this token, we highlight a nested political game, in which the President considers the loyalty of both mayors and governors combined to decide when to reward (or when not to reward) municipalities. Furthermore, we find that the Executive provides aid to smaller municipalities to circumvent the possibility of funding mayors from larger cities who may pose a threat as political rivals in the future. Since this pattern is more evident in localities with aligned mayors, we can infer that the President's strategy is aimed at preventing future challengers from within their own coalition.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:ar-repo/semantics/conjuntoDeDatos
v1.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/dataSet
format dataSet
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/209595
Clerici, Paula Andrea; Demeco, Lucía; Galeano, Franco; Negri Malbran, Juan Javier; (2023): Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. (dataset). http://hdl.handle.net/11336/209595
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/209595
identifier_str_mv Clerici, Paula Andrea; Demeco, Lucía; Galeano, Franco; Negri Malbran, Juan Javier; (2023): Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. (dataset). http://hdl.handle.net/11336/209595
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/octet-stream
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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