Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction
- Autores
- Clerici, Paula Andrea; Demeco, Lucía; Galeano, Franco; Negri Malbran, Juan Javier
- Año de publicación
- 2023
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- conjunto de datos
- Estado
- Descripción
- In federal presidential democracies, discretionary transfers are often mentioned as a tool used by the national executive to build and strengthen subnational support, typically governors. Funds to local mayors, however, have been much less studied. With original data, in this study, we analyze the distribution of a particular discretionary transfer (ATN) to the Argentine municipalities during two periods: 1997-2000 and 2016-2019. We show that the main driver for transfers is the mayor´s political alignment. Indeed, the president is more likely to reward loyal mayors, but especially when both the latter and the President oppose the provincial governor. By this token, we highlight a nested political game, in which the President considers the loyalty of both mayors and governors combined to decide when to reward (or when not to reward) municipalities. Furthermore, we find that the Executive provides aid to smaller municipalities to circumvent the possibility of funding mayors from larger cities who may pose a threat as political rivals in the future. Since this pattern is more evident in localities with aligned mayors, we can infer that the President's strategy is aimed at preventing future challengers from within their own coalition.
Fil: Clerici, Paula Andrea. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Cs.politica y Estudios Internacionales. Prog.de Estudios Electorales y Legislativos; Argentina
Fil: Demeco, Lucía. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina
Fil: Galeano, Franco. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina
Fil: Negri Malbran, Juan Javier. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
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- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/209595
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political ConstructionClerici, Paula AndreaDemeco, LucíaGaleano, FrancoNegri Malbran, Juan Javierhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5In federal presidential democracies, discretionary transfers are often mentioned as a tool used by the national executive to build and strengthen subnational support, typically governors. Funds to local mayors, however, have been much less studied. With original data, in this study, we analyze the distribution of a particular discretionary transfer (ATN) to the Argentine municipalities during two periods: 1997-2000 and 2016-2019. We show that the main driver for transfers is the mayor´s political alignment. Indeed, the president is more likely to reward loyal mayors, but especially when both the latter and the President oppose the provincial governor. By this token, we highlight a nested political game, in which the President considers the loyalty of both mayors and governors combined to decide when to reward (or when not to reward) municipalities. Furthermore, we find that the Executive provides aid to smaller municipalities to circumvent the possibility of funding mayors from larger cities who may pose a threat as political rivals in the future. Since this pattern is more evident in localities with aligned mayors, we can infer that the President's strategy is aimed at preventing future challengers from within their own coalition.Fil: Clerici, Paula Andrea. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Cs.politica y Estudios Internacionales. Prog.de Estudios Electorales y Legislativos; ArgentinaFil: Demeco, Lucía. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; ArgentinaFil: Galeano, Franco. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; ArgentinaFil: Negri Malbran, Juan Javier. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina2023info:ar-repo/semantics/conjuntoDeDatosv1.0info:eu-repo/semantics/dataSetapplication/octet-streamhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/209595Clerici, Paula Andrea; Demeco, Lucía; Galeano, Franco; Negri Malbran, Juan Javier; (2023): Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. (dataset). http://hdl.handle.net/11336/209595CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2026-01-14T11:54:05Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/209595instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982026-01-14 11:54:05.349CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction |
| title |
Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction |
| spellingShingle |
Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction Clerici, Paula Andrea |
| title_short |
Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction |
| title_full |
Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction |
| title_fullStr |
Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction |
| title_sort |
Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Clerici, Paula Andrea Demeco, Lucía Galeano, Franco Negri Malbran, Juan Javier |
| author |
Clerici, Paula Andrea |
| author_facet |
Clerici, Paula Andrea Demeco, Lucía Galeano, Franco Negri Malbran, Juan Javier |
| author_role |
author |
| author2 |
Demeco, Lucía Galeano, Franco Negri Malbran, Juan Javier |
| author2_role |
author author author |
| purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.6 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5 |
| dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
In federal presidential democracies, discretionary transfers are often mentioned as a tool used by the national executive to build and strengthen subnational support, typically governors. Funds to local mayors, however, have been much less studied. With original data, in this study, we analyze the distribution of a particular discretionary transfer (ATN) to the Argentine municipalities during two periods: 1997-2000 and 2016-2019. We show that the main driver for transfers is the mayor´s political alignment. Indeed, the president is more likely to reward loyal mayors, but especially when both the latter and the President oppose the provincial governor. By this token, we highlight a nested political game, in which the President considers the loyalty of both mayors and governors combined to decide when to reward (or when not to reward) municipalities. Furthermore, we find that the Executive provides aid to smaller municipalities to circumvent the possibility of funding mayors from larger cities who may pose a threat as political rivals in the future. Since this pattern is more evident in localities with aligned mayors, we can infer that the President's strategy is aimed at preventing future challengers from within their own coalition. Fil: Clerici, Paula Andrea. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Cs.politica y Estudios Internacionales. Prog.de Estudios Electorales y Legislativos; Argentina Fil: Demeco, Lucía. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina Fil: Galeano, Franco. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina Fil: Negri Malbran, Juan Javier. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. Departamento de Ciencia Política y Estudios Internacionales; Argentina |
| description |
In federal presidential democracies, discretionary transfers are often mentioned as a tool used by the national executive to build and strengthen subnational support, typically governors. Funds to local mayors, however, have been much less studied. With original data, in this study, we analyze the distribution of a particular discretionary transfer (ATN) to the Argentine municipalities during two periods: 1997-2000 and 2016-2019. We show that the main driver for transfers is the mayor´s political alignment. Indeed, the president is more likely to reward loyal mayors, but especially when both the latter and the President oppose the provincial governor. By this token, we highlight a nested political game, in which the President considers the loyalty of both mayors and governors combined to decide when to reward (or when not to reward) municipalities. Furthermore, we find that the Executive provides aid to smaller municipalities to circumvent the possibility of funding mayors from larger cities who may pose a threat as political rivals in the future. Since this pattern is more evident in localities with aligned mayors, we can infer that the President's strategy is aimed at preventing future challengers from within their own coalition. |
| publishDate |
2023 |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023 |
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info:ar-repo/semantics/conjuntoDeDatos v1.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/dataSet |
| format |
dataSet |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/209595 Clerici, Paula Andrea; Demeco, Lucía; Galeano, Franco; Negri Malbran, Juan Javier; (2023): Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. (dataset). http://hdl.handle.net/11336/209595 CONICET Digital CONICET |
| url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/209595 |
| identifier_str_mv |
Clerici, Paula Andrea; Demeco, Lucía; Galeano, Franco; Negri Malbran, Juan Javier; (2023): Dataset: Mudding the Playing Field. Contributions to Municipalities as a Political Construction. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. (dataset). http://hdl.handle.net/11336/209595 CONICET Digital CONICET |
| dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
| language |
eng |
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dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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