Agency Law and Odious Debts

Autores
Dimitriu, Cristian
Año de publicación
2017
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
Because of the way that the international lending system works, poor nations have been forced to repay sovereign debts without having a moral obligation to do so. Suppose a corrupt public official borrows money from an international agency, or from private investors, and later on embezzles this money, or uses it to oppress the population. Suppose, further, that the lender is aware of the potential of this situation and still lends. Typically, the international community considers that successor governments have the obligation to repay the funds and the interests associated to them. In fact, this is what they usually end up doing. Public officials are all aware that if they do not honour sovereign debts, they will face all kinds of negative consequences, including exclusion from future markets, loss of reputation and legal sanctions. Owing to this mechanism, entire generations have been burdened with debts fraudulently incurred in their name by governments in the past. These kinds of debts have been known in the legal literature as ‘odious’. In this article, I discuss the conditions defining the bindingness of a debt. I suggest that they can be made explicit by looking at the rules under which the lending system works at the domestic level, and by then extending these rules to the international domain. I argue that, because of their plausibility, these are the rules that should govern international lending from now on. I also discuss the feasibility of extending these rules globally, and consider potential objections to my proposal.
Fil: Dimitriu, Cristian. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Goethe Universitat Frankfurt; Alemania. Free University Berlin; Alemania
Materia
GLOBAL JUSTICE
INTERNATIONAL LENDING
ODIOUS DEBTS
WORLD POVERTY
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/74819

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spelling Agency Law and Odious DebtsDimitriu, CristianGLOBAL JUSTICEINTERNATIONAL LENDINGODIOUS DEBTSWORLD POVERTYhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6Because of the way that the international lending system works, poor nations have been forced to repay sovereign debts without having a moral obligation to do so. Suppose a corrupt public official borrows money from an international agency, or from private investors, and later on embezzles this money, or uses it to oppress the population. Suppose, further, that the lender is aware of the potential of this situation and still lends. Typically, the international community considers that successor governments have the obligation to repay the funds and the interests associated to them. In fact, this is what they usually end up doing. Public officials are all aware that if they do not honour sovereign debts, they will face all kinds of negative consequences, including exclusion from future markets, loss of reputation and legal sanctions. Owing to this mechanism, entire generations have been burdened with debts fraudulently incurred in their name by governments in the past. These kinds of debts have been known in the legal literature as ‘odious’. In this article, I discuss the conditions defining the bindingness of a debt. I suggest that they can be made explicit by looking at the rules under which the lending system works at the domestic level, and by then extending these rules to the international domain. I argue that, because of their plausibility, these are the rules that should govern international lending from now on. I also discuss the feasibility of extending these rules globally, and consider potential objections to my proposal.Fil: Dimitriu, Cristian. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Goethe Universitat Frankfurt; Alemania. Free University Berlin; AlemaniaTaylor & Francis Ltd2017-11info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/74819Dimitriu, Cristian; Agency Law and Odious Debts; Taylor & Francis Ltd; Ethics and Global Politics; 10; 1; 11-2017; 77-971654-6369CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16544951.2017.1389220info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1080/16544951.2017.1389220info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-10T13:04:37Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/74819instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-10 13:04:38.028CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Agency Law and Odious Debts
title Agency Law and Odious Debts
spellingShingle Agency Law and Odious Debts
Dimitriu, Cristian
GLOBAL JUSTICE
INTERNATIONAL LENDING
ODIOUS DEBTS
WORLD POVERTY
title_short Agency Law and Odious Debts
title_full Agency Law and Odious Debts
title_fullStr Agency Law and Odious Debts
title_full_unstemmed Agency Law and Odious Debts
title_sort Agency Law and Odious Debts
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Dimitriu, Cristian
author Dimitriu, Cristian
author_facet Dimitriu, Cristian
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv GLOBAL JUSTICE
INTERNATIONAL LENDING
ODIOUS DEBTS
WORLD POVERTY
topic GLOBAL JUSTICE
INTERNATIONAL LENDING
ODIOUS DEBTS
WORLD POVERTY
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv Because of the way that the international lending system works, poor nations have been forced to repay sovereign debts without having a moral obligation to do so. Suppose a corrupt public official borrows money from an international agency, or from private investors, and later on embezzles this money, or uses it to oppress the population. Suppose, further, that the lender is aware of the potential of this situation and still lends. Typically, the international community considers that successor governments have the obligation to repay the funds and the interests associated to them. In fact, this is what they usually end up doing. Public officials are all aware that if they do not honour sovereign debts, they will face all kinds of negative consequences, including exclusion from future markets, loss of reputation and legal sanctions. Owing to this mechanism, entire generations have been burdened with debts fraudulently incurred in their name by governments in the past. These kinds of debts have been known in the legal literature as ‘odious’. In this article, I discuss the conditions defining the bindingness of a debt. I suggest that they can be made explicit by looking at the rules under which the lending system works at the domestic level, and by then extending these rules to the international domain. I argue that, because of their plausibility, these are the rules that should govern international lending from now on. I also discuss the feasibility of extending these rules globally, and consider potential objections to my proposal.
Fil: Dimitriu, Cristian. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Goethe Universitat Frankfurt; Alemania. Free University Berlin; Alemania
description Because of the way that the international lending system works, poor nations have been forced to repay sovereign debts without having a moral obligation to do so. Suppose a corrupt public official borrows money from an international agency, or from private investors, and later on embezzles this money, or uses it to oppress the population. Suppose, further, that the lender is aware of the potential of this situation and still lends. Typically, the international community considers that successor governments have the obligation to repay the funds and the interests associated to them. In fact, this is what they usually end up doing. Public officials are all aware that if they do not honour sovereign debts, they will face all kinds of negative consequences, including exclusion from future markets, loss of reputation and legal sanctions. Owing to this mechanism, entire generations have been burdened with debts fraudulently incurred in their name by governments in the past. These kinds of debts have been known in the legal literature as ‘odious’. In this article, I discuss the conditions defining the bindingness of a debt. I suggest that they can be made explicit by looking at the rules under which the lending system works at the domestic level, and by then extending these rules to the international domain. I argue that, because of their plausibility, these are the rules that should govern international lending from now on. I also discuss the feasibility of extending these rules globally, and consider potential objections to my proposal.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-11
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/74819
Dimitriu, Cristian; Agency Law and Odious Debts; Taylor & Francis Ltd; Ethics and Global Politics; 10; 1; 11-2017; 77-97
1654-6369
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/74819
identifier_str_mv Dimitriu, Cristian; Agency Law and Odious Debts; Taylor & Francis Ltd; Ethics and Global Politics; 10; 1; 11-2017; 77-97
1654-6369
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16544951.2017.1389220
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1080/16544951.2017.1389220
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Taylor & Francis Ltd
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Taylor & Francis Ltd
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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