Agency Law and Odious Debts
- Autores
- Dimitriu, Cristian
- Año de publicación
- 2017
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- Because of the way that the international lending system works, poor nations have been forced to repay sovereign debts without having a moral obligation to do so. Suppose a corrupt public official borrows money from an international agency, or from private investors, and later on embezzles this money, or uses it to oppress the population. Suppose, further, that the lender is aware of the potential of this situation and still lends. Typically, the international community considers that successor governments have the obligation to repay the funds and the interests associated to them. In fact, this is what they usually end up doing. Public officials are all aware that if they do not honour sovereign debts, they will face all kinds of negative consequences, including exclusion from future markets, loss of reputation and legal sanctions. Owing to this mechanism, entire generations have been burdened with debts fraudulently incurred in their name by governments in the past. These kinds of debts have been known in the legal literature as ‘odious’. In this article, I discuss the conditions defining the bindingness of a debt. I suggest that they can be made explicit by looking at the rules under which the lending system works at the domestic level, and by then extending these rules to the international domain. I argue that, because of their plausibility, these are the rules that should govern international lending from now on. I also discuss the feasibility of extending these rules globally, and consider potential objections to my proposal.
Fil: Dimitriu, Cristian. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Goethe Universitat Frankfurt; Alemania. Free University Berlin; Alemania - Materia
-
GLOBAL JUSTICE
INTERNATIONAL LENDING
ODIOUS DEBTS
WORLD POVERTY - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/74819
Ver los metadatos del registro completo
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Agency Law and Odious DebtsDimitriu, CristianGLOBAL JUSTICEINTERNATIONAL LENDINGODIOUS DEBTSWORLD POVERTYhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6Because of the way that the international lending system works, poor nations have been forced to repay sovereign debts without having a moral obligation to do so. Suppose a corrupt public official borrows money from an international agency, or from private investors, and later on embezzles this money, or uses it to oppress the population. Suppose, further, that the lender is aware of the potential of this situation and still lends. Typically, the international community considers that successor governments have the obligation to repay the funds and the interests associated to them. In fact, this is what they usually end up doing. Public officials are all aware that if they do not honour sovereign debts, they will face all kinds of negative consequences, including exclusion from future markets, loss of reputation and legal sanctions. Owing to this mechanism, entire generations have been burdened with debts fraudulently incurred in their name by governments in the past. These kinds of debts have been known in the legal literature as ‘odious’. In this article, I discuss the conditions defining the bindingness of a debt. I suggest that they can be made explicit by looking at the rules under which the lending system works at the domestic level, and by then extending these rules to the international domain. I argue that, because of their plausibility, these are the rules that should govern international lending from now on. I also discuss the feasibility of extending these rules globally, and consider potential objections to my proposal.Fil: Dimitriu, Cristian. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Goethe Universitat Frankfurt; Alemania. Free University Berlin; AlemaniaTaylor & Francis Ltd2017-11info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/74819Dimitriu, Cristian; Agency Law and Odious Debts; Taylor & Francis Ltd; Ethics and Global Politics; 10; 1; 11-2017; 77-971654-6369CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16544951.2017.1389220info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1080/16544951.2017.1389220info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-10T13:04:37Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/74819instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-10 13:04:38.028CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Agency Law and Odious Debts |
title |
Agency Law and Odious Debts |
spellingShingle |
Agency Law and Odious Debts Dimitriu, Cristian GLOBAL JUSTICE INTERNATIONAL LENDING ODIOUS DEBTS WORLD POVERTY |
title_short |
Agency Law and Odious Debts |
title_full |
Agency Law and Odious Debts |
title_fullStr |
Agency Law and Odious Debts |
title_full_unstemmed |
Agency Law and Odious Debts |
title_sort |
Agency Law and Odious Debts |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Dimitriu, Cristian |
author |
Dimitriu, Cristian |
author_facet |
Dimitriu, Cristian |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
GLOBAL JUSTICE INTERNATIONAL LENDING ODIOUS DEBTS WORLD POVERTY |
topic |
GLOBAL JUSTICE INTERNATIONAL LENDING ODIOUS DEBTS WORLD POVERTY |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
Because of the way that the international lending system works, poor nations have been forced to repay sovereign debts without having a moral obligation to do so. Suppose a corrupt public official borrows money from an international agency, or from private investors, and later on embezzles this money, or uses it to oppress the population. Suppose, further, that the lender is aware of the potential of this situation and still lends. Typically, the international community considers that successor governments have the obligation to repay the funds and the interests associated to them. In fact, this is what they usually end up doing. Public officials are all aware that if they do not honour sovereign debts, they will face all kinds of negative consequences, including exclusion from future markets, loss of reputation and legal sanctions. Owing to this mechanism, entire generations have been burdened with debts fraudulently incurred in their name by governments in the past. These kinds of debts have been known in the legal literature as ‘odious’. In this article, I discuss the conditions defining the bindingness of a debt. I suggest that they can be made explicit by looking at the rules under which the lending system works at the domestic level, and by then extending these rules to the international domain. I argue that, because of their plausibility, these are the rules that should govern international lending from now on. I also discuss the feasibility of extending these rules globally, and consider potential objections to my proposal. Fil: Dimitriu, Cristian. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Sadaf; Argentina. Goethe Universitat Frankfurt; Alemania. Free University Berlin; Alemania |
description |
Because of the way that the international lending system works, poor nations have been forced to repay sovereign debts without having a moral obligation to do so. Suppose a corrupt public official borrows money from an international agency, or from private investors, and later on embezzles this money, or uses it to oppress the population. Suppose, further, that the lender is aware of the potential of this situation and still lends. Typically, the international community considers that successor governments have the obligation to repay the funds and the interests associated to them. In fact, this is what they usually end up doing. Public officials are all aware that if they do not honour sovereign debts, they will face all kinds of negative consequences, including exclusion from future markets, loss of reputation and legal sanctions. Owing to this mechanism, entire generations have been burdened with debts fraudulently incurred in their name by governments in the past. These kinds of debts have been known in the legal literature as ‘odious’. In this article, I discuss the conditions defining the bindingness of a debt. I suggest that they can be made explicit by looking at the rules under which the lending system works at the domestic level, and by then extending these rules to the international domain. I argue that, because of their plausibility, these are the rules that should govern international lending from now on. I also discuss the feasibility of extending these rules globally, and consider potential objections to my proposal. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-11 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/74819 Dimitriu, Cristian; Agency Law and Odious Debts; Taylor & Francis Ltd; Ethics and Global Politics; 10; 1; 11-2017; 77-97 1654-6369 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/74819 |
identifier_str_mv |
Dimitriu, Cristian; Agency Law and Odious Debts; Taylor & Francis Ltd; Ethics and Global Politics; 10; 1; 11-2017; 77-97 1654-6369 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/16544951.2017.1389220 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1080/16544951.2017.1389220 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
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openAccess |
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https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
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application/pdf application/pdf |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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