Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer?
- Autores
- Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique
- Año de publicación
- 2015
- Idioma
- inglés
- Tipo de recurso
- artículo
- Estado
- versión publicada
- Descripción
- The question I address in this paper is whether it is morally wrong for a lawyer to represent a client whose purpose is immoral or unjust. My answer to this question is that it is wrong, prima facie. This conclusion holds, even accepting certain traditional principles of lawyers professional ethics, such as the right of defense and the so-called principle of adversarial litigation. Both the adversarial system and the right of defense are sufficient to support or justify the right of potential clients (and citizens in general) to defend their interests in the judicial system and to do so with the technical assistance of a lawyer. This right includes a right to pursue unjust or immoral purposes (within the law). However, having a right to do X does not mean that it is morally right to do X. We can have a right to do something morally wrong. This being so, the fundamental moral reason for a lawyer not to accept representation for a client with an immoral purpose is that it is, prima facie, morally wrong to help someone do something wrong.
Fil: Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina - Materia
-
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
LAWYERS - Nivel de accesibilidad
- acceso abierto
- Condiciones de uso
- https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
- Repositorio
- Institución
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- OAI Identificador
- oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/111432
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Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer?Rivera López, Eduardo EnriquePROFESSIONAL ETHICSLAWYERShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6The question I address in this paper is whether it is morally wrong for a lawyer to represent a client whose purpose is immoral or unjust. My answer to this question is that it is wrong, prima facie. This conclusion holds, even accepting certain traditional principles of lawyers professional ethics, such as the right of defense and the so-called principle of adversarial litigation. Both the adversarial system and the right of defense are sufficient to support or justify the right of potential clients (and citizens in general) to defend their interests in the judicial system and to do so with the technical assistance of a lawyer. This right includes a right to pursue unjust or immoral purposes (within the law). However, having a right to do X does not mean that it is morally right to do X. We can have a right to do something morally wrong. This being so, the fundamental moral reason for a lawyer not to accept representation for a client with an immoral purpose is that it is, prima facie, morally wrong to help someone do something wrong.Fil: Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; ArgentinaWiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc2015-05info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/111432Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique; Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer?; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Journal of Applied Philosophy; 32; 2; 5-2015; 177-1891468-5930CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/japp.12082info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/japp.12082info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T09:52:42Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/111432instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 09:52:42.98CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer? |
title |
Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer? |
spellingShingle |
Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer? Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique PROFESSIONAL ETHICS LAWYERS |
title_short |
Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer? |
title_full |
Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer? |
title_fullStr |
Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer? |
title_sort |
Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer? |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique |
author |
Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique |
author_facet |
Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique |
author_role |
author |
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS LAWYERS |
topic |
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS LAWYERS |
purl_subject.fl_str_mv |
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv |
The question I address in this paper is whether it is morally wrong for a lawyer to represent a client whose purpose is immoral or unjust. My answer to this question is that it is wrong, prima facie. This conclusion holds, even accepting certain traditional principles of lawyers professional ethics, such as the right of defense and the so-called principle of adversarial litigation. Both the adversarial system and the right of defense are sufficient to support or justify the right of potential clients (and citizens in general) to defend their interests in the judicial system and to do so with the technical assistance of a lawyer. This right includes a right to pursue unjust or immoral purposes (within the law). However, having a right to do X does not mean that it is morally right to do X. We can have a right to do something morally wrong. This being so, the fundamental moral reason for a lawyer not to accept representation for a client with an immoral purpose is that it is, prima facie, morally wrong to help someone do something wrong. Fil: Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Argentina |
description |
The question I address in this paper is whether it is morally wrong for a lawyer to represent a client whose purpose is immoral or unjust. My answer to this question is that it is wrong, prima facie. This conclusion holds, even accepting certain traditional principles of lawyers professional ethics, such as the right of defense and the so-called principle of adversarial litigation. Both the adversarial system and the right of defense are sufficient to support or justify the right of potential clients (and citizens in general) to defend their interests in the judicial system and to do so with the technical assistance of a lawyer. This right includes a right to pursue unjust or immoral purposes (within the law). However, having a right to do X does not mean that it is morally right to do X. We can have a right to do something morally wrong. This being so, the fundamental moral reason for a lawyer not to accept representation for a client with an immoral purpose is that it is, prima facie, morally wrong to help someone do something wrong. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2015-05 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/111432 Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique; Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer?; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Journal of Applied Philosophy; 32; 2; 5-2015; 177-189 1468-5930 CONICET Digital CONICET |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11336/111432 |
identifier_str_mv |
Rivera López, Eduardo Enrique; Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer?; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Journal of Applied Philosophy; 32; 2; 5-2015; 177-189 1468-5930 CONICET Digital CONICET |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/japp.12082 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/japp.12082 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
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https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/ |
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application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc |
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reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET) instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
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dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar |
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