Shapley value in a model of information transferal

Autores
Galdeano, Patricia Lucia; Oviedo, Jorge Armando; Quintas, Luis Guillermo
Año de publicación
2010
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
In this paper we analyze the value of the information in a cooperative model. There is an agent (the innovator), having relevant information which can be sold to some potential buyers. The n potential users of the information share a market. The expected utility of each of them can be improved by obtaining the information. The whole situation is modelled as a (n + 1)–person cooperative game. We study the properties of the characteristic function of this game. It fulfills a weak version of the superadditivity property, namely 0-monotonicity. The game is proved to be monotonic. We compute the Shapley value and we prove it is an imputation for the game. We compare the Shapley value with the equilibrium studied in a noncooperative model by Quintas (1995). We also study some limit cases when the potential buyers are completely informed or uninformed. It includes Big Boss Games (Muto et al. (1988)) and other limit cases. We conclude that in a cooperative environment the buyers avoid being exploited by the innovator. Conversely the innovator obtains a higher utility in a noncooperative game.
Fil: Galdeano, Patricia Lucia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; Argentina
Fil: Oviedo, Jorge Armando. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; Argentina
Fil: Quintas, Luis Guillermo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; Argentina
Materia
Models of Information Transferal
Cooperative Games
0-Monotonicity
Shapley Value
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/15584
Acceder
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oai_identifier_str oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/15584
network_acronym_str CONICETDig
repository_id_str 3498
network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Shapley value in a model of information transferalGaldeano, Patricia LuciaOviedo, Jorge ArmandoQuintas, Luis GuillermoModels of Information TransferalCooperative Games0-MonotonicityShapley Valuehttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1In this paper we analyze the value of the information in a cooperative model. There is an agent (the innovator), having relevant information which can be sold to some potential buyers. The n potential users of the information share a market. The expected utility of each of them can be improved by obtaining the information. The whole situation is modelled as a (n + 1)–person cooperative game. We study the properties of the characteristic function of this game. It fulfills a weak version of the superadditivity property, namely 0-monotonicity. The game is proved to be monotonic. We compute the Shapley value and we prove it is an imputation for the game. We compare the Shapley value with the equilibrium studied in a noncooperative model by Quintas (1995). We also study some limit cases when the potential buyers are completely informed or uninformed. It includes Big Boss Games (Muto et al. (1988)) and other limit cases. We conclude that in a cooperative environment the buyers avoid being exploited by the innovator. Conversely the innovator obtains a higher utility in a noncooperative game.Fil: Galdeano, Patricia Lucia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; ArgentinaFil: Oviedo, Jorge Armando. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; ArgentinaFil: Quintas, Luis Guillermo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; ArgentinaWorld Scientific2010-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/15584Galdeano, Patricia Lucia; Oviedo, Jorge Armando; Quintas, Luis Guillermo; Shapley value in a model of information transferal; World Scientific; International Game Theory Review; 12; 1; 3-2010; 19-350219-1989enginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1142/S0219198910002490info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198910002490info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T10:10:59Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/15584instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 10:11:00.066CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Shapley value in a model of information transferal
title Shapley value in a model of information transferal
spellingShingle Shapley value in a model of information transferal
Galdeano, Patricia Lucia
Models of Information Transferal
Cooperative Games
0-Monotonicity
Shapley Value
title_short Shapley value in a model of information transferal
title_full Shapley value in a model of information transferal
title_fullStr Shapley value in a model of information transferal
title_full_unstemmed Shapley value in a model of information transferal
title_sort Shapley value in a model of information transferal
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Galdeano, Patricia Lucia
Oviedo, Jorge Armando
Quintas, Luis Guillermo
author Galdeano, Patricia Lucia
author_facet Galdeano, Patricia Lucia
Oviedo, Jorge Armando
Quintas, Luis Guillermo
author_role author
author2 Oviedo, Jorge Armando
Quintas, Luis Guillermo
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Models of Information Transferal
Cooperative Games
0-Monotonicity
Shapley Value
topic Models of Information Transferal
Cooperative Games
0-Monotonicity
Shapley Value
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1.1
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/1
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv In this paper we analyze the value of the information in a cooperative model. There is an agent (the innovator), having relevant information which can be sold to some potential buyers. The n potential users of the information share a market. The expected utility of each of them can be improved by obtaining the information. The whole situation is modelled as a (n + 1)–person cooperative game. We study the properties of the characteristic function of this game. It fulfills a weak version of the superadditivity property, namely 0-monotonicity. The game is proved to be monotonic. We compute the Shapley value and we prove it is an imputation for the game. We compare the Shapley value with the equilibrium studied in a noncooperative model by Quintas (1995). We also study some limit cases when the potential buyers are completely informed or uninformed. It includes Big Boss Games (Muto et al. (1988)) and other limit cases. We conclude that in a cooperative environment the buyers avoid being exploited by the innovator. Conversely the innovator obtains a higher utility in a noncooperative game.
Fil: Galdeano, Patricia Lucia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; Argentina
Fil: Oviedo, Jorge Armando. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; Argentina
Fil: Quintas, Luis Guillermo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional de San Luis. Facultad de Ciencias Físico, Matemáticas y Naturales. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis ; Argentina
description In this paper we analyze the value of the information in a cooperative model. There is an agent (the innovator), having relevant information which can be sold to some potential buyers. The n potential users of the information share a market. The expected utility of each of them can be improved by obtaining the information. The whole situation is modelled as a (n + 1)–person cooperative game. We study the properties of the characteristic function of this game. It fulfills a weak version of the superadditivity property, namely 0-monotonicity. The game is proved to be monotonic. We compute the Shapley value and we prove it is an imputation for the game. We compare the Shapley value with the equilibrium studied in a noncooperative model by Quintas (1995). We also study some limit cases when the potential buyers are completely informed or uninformed. It includes Big Boss Games (Muto et al. (1988)) and other limit cases. We conclude that in a cooperative environment the buyers avoid being exploited by the innovator. Conversely the innovator obtains a higher utility in a noncooperative game.
publishDate 2010
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2010-03
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/15584
Galdeano, Patricia Lucia; Oviedo, Jorge Armando; Quintas, Luis Guillermo; Shapley value in a model of information transferal; World Scientific; International Game Theory Review; 12; 1; 3-2010; 19-35
0219-1989
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/15584
identifier_str_mv Galdeano, Patricia Lucia; Oviedo, Jorge Armando; Quintas, Luis Guillermo; Shapley value in a model of information transferal; World Scientific; International Game Theory Review; 12; 1; 3-2010; 19-35
0219-1989
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1142/S0219198910002490
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198910002490
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv World Scientific
publisher.none.fl_str_mv World Scientific
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.069144

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