A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?

Autores
Brei, Michael; Schclarek Curutchet, Alfredo
Año de publicación
2015
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
The present study investigates theoretically the lending responses of government-owned and private banks in the event of unexpected financial shocks. Our model predicts that public banks provide more loans to the real sector during times of crisis, compared to private banks which cut down on lending and increase liquidity holdings. We put forth three reasons for this heterogeneous behavior. First, the objective of public banks, in contrast to their private peers, is not only to maximize profits given risks, but also to stabilize and promote the recovery of the economy. Second, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals or avoid a bank run in a severe crisis, because the state has better access to additional funds making a recapitalization more likely. And finally, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals due to their higher credibility in promising a future recapitalization in the case of a severe crisis.
Fil: Brei, Michael. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Francia. The University of the West Indies; Trinidad y Tobago
Fil: Schclarek Curutchet, Alfredo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Economía; Argentina
Materia
Financial Crisis
Bank Lending
Public Banks
Bank Runs
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/44885

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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?Brei, MichaelSchclarek Curutchet, AlfredoFinancial CrisisBank LendingPublic BanksBank Runshttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5The present study investigates theoretically the lending responses of government-owned and private banks in the event of unexpected financial shocks. Our model predicts that public banks provide more loans to the real sector during times of crisis, compared to private banks which cut down on lending and increase liquidity holdings. We put forth three reasons for this heterogeneous behavior. First, the objective of public banks, in contrast to their private peers, is not only to maximize profits given risks, but also to stabilize and promote the recovery of the economy. Second, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals or avoid a bank run in a severe crisis, because the state has better access to additional funds making a recapitalization more likely. And finally, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals due to their higher credibility in promising a future recapitalization in the case of a severe crisis.Fil: Brei, Michael. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Francia. The University of the West Indies; Trinidad y TobagoFil: Schclarek Curutchet, Alfredo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Economía; ArgentinaElsevier2015-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/44885Brei, Michael; Schclarek Curutchet, Alfredo; A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?; Elsevier; Journal of Banking & Finance; 50; 1-2015; 298-3070378-4266CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.038info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426614001216info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T10:11:05Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/44885instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 10:11:05.513CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?
title A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?
spellingShingle A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?
Brei, Michael
Financial Crisis
Bank Lending
Public Banks
Bank Runs
title_short A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?
title_full A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?
title_fullStr A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?
title_full_unstemmed A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?
title_sort A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Brei, Michael
Schclarek Curutchet, Alfredo
author Brei, Michael
author_facet Brei, Michael
Schclarek Curutchet, Alfredo
author_role author
author2 Schclarek Curutchet, Alfredo
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Financial Crisis
Bank Lending
Public Banks
Bank Runs
topic Financial Crisis
Bank Lending
Public Banks
Bank Runs
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The present study investigates theoretically the lending responses of government-owned and private banks in the event of unexpected financial shocks. Our model predicts that public banks provide more loans to the real sector during times of crisis, compared to private banks which cut down on lending and increase liquidity holdings. We put forth three reasons for this heterogeneous behavior. First, the objective of public banks, in contrast to their private peers, is not only to maximize profits given risks, but also to stabilize and promote the recovery of the economy. Second, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals or avoid a bank run in a severe crisis, because the state has better access to additional funds making a recapitalization more likely. And finally, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals due to their higher credibility in promising a future recapitalization in the case of a severe crisis.
Fil: Brei, Michael. Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Francia. The University of the West Indies; Trinidad y Tobago
Fil: Schclarek Curutchet, Alfredo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Departamento de Economía; Argentina
description The present study investigates theoretically the lending responses of government-owned and private banks in the event of unexpected financial shocks. Our model predicts that public banks provide more loans to the real sector during times of crisis, compared to private banks which cut down on lending and increase liquidity holdings. We put forth three reasons for this heterogeneous behavior. First, the objective of public banks, in contrast to their private peers, is not only to maximize profits given risks, but also to stabilize and promote the recovery of the economy. Second, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals or avoid a bank run in a severe crisis, because the state has better access to additional funds making a recapitalization more likely. And finally, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals due to their higher credibility in promising a future recapitalization in the case of a severe crisis.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/44885
Brei, Michael; Schclarek Curutchet, Alfredo; A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?; Elsevier; Journal of Banking & Finance; 50; 1-2015; 298-307
0378-4266
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/44885
identifier_str_mv Brei, Michael; Schclarek Curutchet, Alfredo; A theoretical model of bank lending: Does ownership matter in times of crisis?; Elsevier; Journal of Banking & Finance; 50; 1-2015; 298-307
0378-4266
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.038
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378426614001216
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.13397