Could corporate governance practices enhance social welfare?

Autores
Chisari, Omar Osvaldo; Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo; Maquieyra, Javier A.
Año de publicación
2012
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
The purpose of the article is to contribute to the quantitative evaluation of economy-wide corporate governance reforms. In the literature quantitative studies on this issue are not common. The computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach offers useful insights, which complement a partial equilibrium (firm level) analysis. In this study, corporate governance is assumed to be costly for those firms that implement it and we model it as an additional cost with spill-over on the rest of the economy through the price system. The model is simulated using 2006 macroeconomic data for Argentina. An additional internal audit body is required of firms implementing corporate governance (public firms) in the country. Auditors are thus the direct recipient of those costs and they provide the possibility of proxy corporate governance incremental expenses for public firms. Simulations assume different scenarios and potential benefits from corporate governance are considered too. The article models potential benefits in terms of reduced cost of capital and simulates various scenarios where: (1) there are no benefits, (2) cost of capital is reduced (permanently), (3) the reduction is temporary and (4) the volatility of the cost of capital is reduced.
Fil: Chisari, Omar Osvaldo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Argentina de la Empresa. Secretaria Academica y de Investigacion. Instituto de Economia.; Argentina
Fil: Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Argentina de la Empresa. Secretaria Academica y de Investigacion. Instituto de Economia.; Argentina
Fil: Maquieyra, Javier A.. Universidad Argentina de la Empresa; Argentina
Materia
COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BENEFITS
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COSTS
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/194825
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Could corporate governance practices enhance social welfare?Chisari, Omar OsvaldoFerro, Gustavo AdolfoMaquieyra, Javier A.COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELSCORPORATE GOVERNANCE BENEFITSCORPORATE GOVERNANCE COSTShttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5The purpose of the article is to contribute to the quantitative evaluation of economy-wide corporate governance reforms. In the literature quantitative studies on this issue are not common. The computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach offers useful insights, which complement a partial equilibrium (firm level) analysis. In this study, corporate governance is assumed to be costly for those firms that implement it and we model it as an additional cost with spill-over on the rest of the economy through the price system. The model is simulated using 2006 macroeconomic data for Argentina. An additional internal audit body is required of firms implementing corporate governance (public firms) in the country. Auditors are thus the direct recipient of those costs and they provide the possibility of proxy corporate governance incremental expenses for public firms. Simulations assume different scenarios and potential benefits from corporate governance are considered too. The article models potential benefits in terms of reduced cost of capital and simulates various scenarios where: (1) there are no benefits, (2) cost of capital is reduced (permanently), (3) the reduction is temporary and (4) the volatility of the cost of capital is reduced.Fil: Chisari, Omar Osvaldo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Argentina de la Empresa. Secretaria Academica y de Investigacion. Instituto de Economia.; ArgentinaFil: Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Argentina de la Empresa. Secretaria Academica y de Investigacion. Instituto de Economia.; ArgentinaFil: Maquieyra, Javier A.. Universidad Argentina de la Empresa; ArgentinaPalgrave Macmillan2012-08info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/194825Chisari, Omar Osvaldo; Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo; Maquieyra, Javier A.; Could corporate governance practices enhance social welfare?; Palgrave Macmillan; International Journal of Disclosure and Governance; 11; 2; 8-2012; 99-1131741-3591CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/jdg.2012.16info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1057/jdg.2012.16info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-29T09:42:56Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/194825instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-29 09:42:56.269CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Could corporate governance practices enhance social welfare?
title Could corporate governance practices enhance social welfare?
spellingShingle Could corporate governance practices enhance social welfare?
Chisari, Omar Osvaldo
COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BENEFITS
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COSTS
title_short Could corporate governance practices enhance social welfare?
title_full Could corporate governance practices enhance social welfare?
title_fullStr Could corporate governance practices enhance social welfare?
title_full_unstemmed Could corporate governance practices enhance social welfare?
title_sort Could corporate governance practices enhance social welfare?
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Chisari, Omar Osvaldo
Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo
Maquieyra, Javier A.
author Chisari, Omar Osvaldo
author_facet Chisari, Omar Osvaldo
Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo
Maquieyra, Javier A.
author_role author
author2 Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo
Maquieyra, Javier A.
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BENEFITS
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COSTS
topic COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BENEFITS
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COSTS
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The purpose of the article is to contribute to the quantitative evaluation of economy-wide corporate governance reforms. In the literature quantitative studies on this issue are not common. The computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach offers useful insights, which complement a partial equilibrium (firm level) analysis. In this study, corporate governance is assumed to be costly for those firms that implement it and we model it as an additional cost with spill-over on the rest of the economy through the price system. The model is simulated using 2006 macroeconomic data for Argentina. An additional internal audit body is required of firms implementing corporate governance (public firms) in the country. Auditors are thus the direct recipient of those costs and they provide the possibility of proxy corporate governance incremental expenses for public firms. Simulations assume different scenarios and potential benefits from corporate governance are considered too. The article models potential benefits in terms of reduced cost of capital and simulates various scenarios where: (1) there are no benefits, (2) cost of capital is reduced (permanently), (3) the reduction is temporary and (4) the volatility of the cost of capital is reduced.
Fil: Chisari, Omar Osvaldo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Argentina de la Empresa. Secretaria Academica y de Investigacion. Instituto de Economia.; Argentina
Fil: Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Argentina de la Empresa. Secretaria Academica y de Investigacion. Instituto de Economia.; Argentina
Fil: Maquieyra, Javier A.. Universidad Argentina de la Empresa; Argentina
description The purpose of the article is to contribute to the quantitative evaluation of economy-wide corporate governance reforms. In the literature quantitative studies on this issue are not common. The computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach offers useful insights, which complement a partial equilibrium (firm level) analysis. In this study, corporate governance is assumed to be costly for those firms that implement it and we model it as an additional cost with spill-over on the rest of the economy through the price system. The model is simulated using 2006 macroeconomic data for Argentina. An additional internal audit body is required of firms implementing corporate governance (public firms) in the country. Auditors are thus the direct recipient of those costs and they provide the possibility of proxy corporate governance incremental expenses for public firms. Simulations assume different scenarios and potential benefits from corporate governance are considered too. The article models potential benefits in terms of reduced cost of capital and simulates various scenarios where: (1) there are no benefits, (2) cost of capital is reduced (permanently), (3) the reduction is temporary and (4) the volatility of the cost of capital is reduced.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012-08
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/194825
Chisari, Omar Osvaldo; Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo; Maquieyra, Javier A.; Could corporate governance practices enhance social welfare?; Palgrave Macmillan; International Journal of Disclosure and Governance; 11; 2; 8-2012; 99-113
1741-3591
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/194825
identifier_str_mv Chisari, Omar Osvaldo; Ferro, Gustavo Adolfo; Maquieyra, Javier A.; Could corporate governance practices enhance social welfare?; Palgrave Macmillan; International Journal of Disclosure and Governance; 11; 2; 8-2012; 99-113
1741-3591
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/jdg.2012.16
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1057/jdg.2012.16
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Palgrave Macmillan
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Palgrave Macmillan
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.069144

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