Defending the Guilty: a moral justification

Autores
Seleme, Hugo Omar
Año de publicación
2013
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
There are certain acts necessary to exercise the legal profession within an adversary system that are usually morally condemned by public opinion. If the lawyer knows that his or her client is guilty and is aware, therefore, that he or she deserves punishment, defending him or her appears to imply some sort of deceit or interference in the attainment of a just result. The hypothesis defended in the present paper is that the strategies that are usually adopted to rebut public condemnation have not been successful on account of the moral costs involved in assuming each of them. Strategies based on ‘role morality’ are not an exception. The purpose of this paper is to offer a rebuttal of the condemnation argument that does not entail any moral cost. This novel counterargument is based on the prospective conception of obligation developed by Michael Zimmerman.
Fil: Seleme, Hugo Omar. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
Materia
Legal Ethics
Defence Lawyer
Right of Defence
Adversarial System
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/23325
Acceder
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spelling Defending the Guilty: a moral justificationSeleme, Hugo OmarLegal EthicsDefence LawyerRight of DefenceAdversarial Systemhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5There are certain acts necessary to exercise the legal profession within an adversary system that are usually morally condemned by public opinion. If the lawyer knows that his or her client is guilty and is aware, therefore, that he or she deserves punishment, defending him or her appears to imply some sort of deceit or interference in the attainment of a just result. The hypothesis defended in the present paper is that the strategies that are usually adopted to rebut public condemnation have not been successful on account of the moral costs involved in assuming each of them. Strategies based on ‘role morality’ are not an exception. The purpose of this paper is to offer a rebuttal of the condemnation argument that does not entail any moral cost. This novel counterargument is based on the prospective conception of obligation developed by Michael Zimmerman.Fil: Seleme, Hugo Omar. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaPeeters Publishers2013-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/23325Seleme, Hugo Omar; Defending the Guilty: a moral justification; Peeters Publishers; Ethical Perspectives; 20; 2; 6-2013; 299-3271370-00491783-1431CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.ethical-perspectives.be/page.php?FILE=ep_issue&ID=1482info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-10-22T11:28:02Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/23325instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-10-22 11:28:03.285CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Defending the Guilty: a moral justification
title Defending the Guilty: a moral justification
spellingShingle Defending the Guilty: a moral justification
Seleme, Hugo Omar
Legal Ethics
Defence Lawyer
Right of Defence
Adversarial System
title_short Defending the Guilty: a moral justification
title_full Defending the Guilty: a moral justification
title_fullStr Defending the Guilty: a moral justification
title_full_unstemmed Defending the Guilty: a moral justification
title_sort Defending the Guilty: a moral justification
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Seleme, Hugo Omar
author Seleme, Hugo Omar
author_facet Seleme, Hugo Omar
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Legal Ethics
Defence Lawyer
Right of Defence
Adversarial System
topic Legal Ethics
Defence Lawyer
Right of Defence
Adversarial System
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.5
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv There are certain acts necessary to exercise the legal profession within an adversary system that are usually morally condemned by public opinion. If the lawyer knows that his or her client is guilty and is aware, therefore, that he or she deserves punishment, defending him or her appears to imply some sort of deceit or interference in the attainment of a just result. The hypothesis defended in the present paper is that the strategies that are usually adopted to rebut public condemnation have not been successful on account of the moral costs involved in assuming each of them. Strategies based on ‘role morality’ are not an exception. The purpose of this paper is to offer a rebuttal of the condemnation argument that does not entail any moral cost. This novel counterargument is based on the prospective conception of obligation developed by Michael Zimmerman.
Fil: Seleme, Hugo Omar. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina
description There are certain acts necessary to exercise the legal profession within an adversary system that are usually morally condemned by public opinion. If the lawyer knows that his or her client is guilty and is aware, therefore, that he or she deserves punishment, defending him or her appears to imply some sort of deceit or interference in the attainment of a just result. The hypothesis defended in the present paper is that the strategies that are usually adopted to rebut public condemnation have not been successful on account of the moral costs involved in assuming each of them. Strategies based on ‘role morality’ are not an exception. The purpose of this paper is to offer a rebuttal of the condemnation argument that does not entail any moral cost. This novel counterargument is based on the prospective conception of obligation developed by Michael Zimmerman.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-06
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/23325
Seleme, Hugo Omar; Defending the Guilty: a moral justification; Peeters Publishers; Ethical Perspectives; 20; 2; 6-2013; 299-327
1370-0049
1783-1431
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/23325
identifier_str_mv Seleme, Hugo Omar; Defending the Guilty: a moral justification; Peeters Publishers; Ethical Perspectives; 20; 2; 6-2013; 299-327
1370-0049
1783-1431
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://www.ethical-perspectives.be/page.php?FILE=ep_issue&ID=1482
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Peeters Publishers
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Peeters Publishers
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 12.982451

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