Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracy

Autores
Albornoz, Facundo; Galiani, Sebastián; Heymann, Carlos Daniel
Año de publicación
2012
Idioma
inglés
Tipo de recurso
artículo
Estado
versión publicada
Descripción
We study the incentives to expropriate foreign capital under democracy and oligarchy. We model a two-sector small open economy where foreign investment triggers Stolper-Samuelson effects through reducing exporting costs. The incentives to expropriate depend on the distributional effects associated to the investment. How investment affects the incomes of the different groups in society depends on the sectors where these investments are undertaken and on structural features of the economy such as factor intensity, factor substitutability, and price and output elasticities. We characterize the equilibria of the expropriation game and show that if investment is undertaken in the sector that uses labor less intensively then democratic expropriations are more likely to take place. We test this prediction and provide strong evidence of its validity.
Fil: Albornoz, Facundo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. University Of Birmingham; Reino Unido
Fil: Galiani, Sebastián. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos
Fil: Heymann, Carlos Daniel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina
Materia
Expropiation
Political Regimes
Democracy
Oligarchy
Nivel de accesibilidad
acceso abierto
Condiciones de uso
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repositorio
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institución
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identificador
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/195284
Acceder
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network_name_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
spelling Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracyAlbornoz, FacundoGaliani, SebastiánHeymann, Carlos DanielExpropiationPolitical RegimesDemocracyOligarchyhttps://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5We study the incentives to expropriate foreign capital under democracy and oligarchy. We model a two-sector small open economy where foreign investment triggers Stolper-Samuelson effects through reducing exporting costs. The incentives to expropriate depend on the distributional effects associated to the investment. How investment affects the incomes of the different groups in society depends on the sectors where these investments are undertaken and on structural features of the economy such as factor intensity, factor substitutability, and price and output elasticities. We characterize the equilibria of the expropriation game and show that if investment is undertaken in the sector that uses labor less intensively then democratic expropriations are more likely to take place. We test this prediction and provide strong evidence of its validity.Fil: Albornoz, Facundo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. University Of Birmingham; Reino UnidoFil: Galiani, Sebastián. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados UnidosFil: Heymann, Carlos Daniel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; ArgentinaWiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc2012-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:ar-repo/semantics/articuloapplication/pdfapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/11336/195284Albornoz, Facundo; Galiani, Sebastián; Heymann, Carlos Daniel; Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracy; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Economics and Politics; 24; 1; 3-2012; 24-460954-1985CONICET DigitalCONICETenginfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00391.xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00391.xinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas2025-09-03T10:06:19Zoai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/195284instacron:CONICETInstitucionalhttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/Organismo científico-tecnológicoNo correspondehttp://ri.conicet.gov.ar/oai/requestdasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.arArgentinaNo correspondeNo correspondeNo correspondeopendoar:34982025-09-03 10:06:19.396CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicasfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracy
title Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracy
spellingShingle Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracy
Albornoz, Facundo
Expropiation
Political Regimes
Democracy
Oligarchy
title_short Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracy
title_full Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracy
title_fullStr Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracy
title_full_unstemmed Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracy
title_sort Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracy
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Albornoz, Facundo
Galiani, Sebastián
Heymann, Carlos Daniel
author Albornoz, Facundo
author_facet Albornoz, Facundo
Galiani, Sebastián
Heymann, Carlos Daniel
author_role author
author2 Galiani, Sebastián
Heymann, Carlos Daniel
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Expropiation
Political Regimes
Democracy
Oligarchy
topic Expropiation
Political Regimes
Democracy
Oligarchy
purl_subject.fl_str_mv https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5.2
https://purl.org/becyt/ford/5
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv We study the incentives to expropriate foreign capital under democracy and oligarchy. We model a two-sector small open economy where foreign investment triggers Stolper-Samuelson effects through reducing exporting costs. The incentives to expropriate depend on the distributional effects associated to the investment. How investment affects the incomes of the different groups in society depends on the sectors where these investments are undertaken and on structural features of the economy such as factor intensity, factor substitutability, and price and output elasticities. We characterize the equilibria of the expropriation game and show that if investment is undertaken in the sector that uses labor less intensively then democratic expropriations are more likely to take place. We test this prediction and provide strong evidence of its validity.
Fil: Albornoz, Facundo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. University Of Birmingham; Reino Unido
Fil: Galiani, Sebastián. Washington University in St. Louis; Estados Unidos
Fil: Heymann, Carlos Daniel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de San Andrés; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina
description We study the incentives to expropriate foreign capital under democracy and oligarchy. We model a two-sector small open economy where foreign investment triggers Stolper-Samuelson effects through reducing exporting costs. The incentives to expropriate depend on the distributional effects associated to the investment. How investment affects the incomes of the different groups in society depends on the sectors where these investments are undertaken and on structural features of the economy such as factor intensity, factor substitutability, and price and output elasticities. We characterize the equilibria of the expropriation game and show that if investment is undertaken in the sector that uses labor less intensively then democratic expropriations are more likely to take place. We test this prediction and provide strong evidence of its validity.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012-03
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
info:ar-repo/semantics/articulo
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/11336/195284
Albornoz, Facundo; Galiani, Sebastián; Heymann, Carlos Daniel; Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracy; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Economics and Politics; 24; 1; 3-2012; 24-46
0954-1985
CONICET Digital
CONICET
url http://hdl.handle.net/11336/195284
identifier_str_mv Albornoz, Facundo; Galiani, Sebastián; Heymann, Carlos Daniel; Foreign investment and expropriation under oligarchy and democracy; Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc; Economics and Politics; 24; 1; 3-2012; 24-46
0954-1985
CONICET Digital
CONICET
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/url/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00391.x
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00391.x
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley Blackwell Publishing, Inc
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname:Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
reponame_str CONICET Digital (CONICET)
collection CONICET Digital (CONICET)
instname_str Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.name.fl_str_mv CONICET Digital (CONICET) - Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
repository.mail.fl_str_mv dasensio@conicet.gov.ar; lcarlino@conicet.gov.ar
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score 13.13397

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