Can countries lobby for foreign direct investment? : evidence from the US

Authors
Montes Rojas, Gabriel Victorio
Publication Year
2018
Language
English
Format
article
Status
Published version
Description
This paper empirically studies a mechanism where foreign direct investment (FDI) recipient countries lobby the US government for the allocation of outward US FDI. In this case, lobbying has the goal of informing US policymakers about their countries' market capabilities and of influencing their attitudes toward recipient countries. In turn, policymakers influence firms' decisions about the location of their potential investments abroad.We empirically estimate the direct influence of the recipient country's lobbying agents in obtaining FDI. The econometric results show that increasing foreign lobbying in the US raises the amount of US FDI received. This amount is potentially large for FDI receiving countries.
Fil: Montes Rojas, Gabriel Victorio. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Saavedra 15. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Política de Buenos Aires. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Instituto Interdisciplinario de Economía Política de Buenos Aires; Argentina
Subject
FDI
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
LOBBYING
Economía, Econometría
Economía y Negocios
CIENCIAS SOCIALES
Access level
Restricted access
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ar/
Repository
CONICET Digital (CONICET)
Institution
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
OAI Identifier
oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/87226